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NEAL DEVINS AND 
LAWRENCE BAUM 
SPLIT DEFINITIVE: HOW PARTY 
POLARIZATION TURNED THE SUPREME 
COURT INTO A PARTISAN COURT 
Since 2010, when Elena Kagan replacedJohn Paul Stevens, all of the 
Republican-nominated Justices on the Supreme Court have been to 
the right of all of its Democratic-nominated Justices. 1 Tlus pattern is 
widely recognized, but it is not well recognized that it is unique in the 
Court's history. Before 2010, the Court never had clear ideological 
blocs that coincided with party lines . 
Today's partisan split, while unprecedented, is likely enduring. The 
very political changes that underlie the current split make it likely that, 
for the foreseeable future, a Court with five Democratic-nonunated 
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hea rt of our analysis o f partisan polarization on the Court. As late as 197 1, presidents would 
sometimes appoint Justices who were associated with a different poli tic;! I party tl1an tl1eir 
own. For reasons deta iled iliroughout tl1is article, there is li ttle prospect o f cross-party ap-
poinuncnts during tl1e current era. 
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Justices would reach decisions quite different from those a Court with 
five Republican-norninated Justices would reach.2 For this reason, 
presidential elections matter more for the Court than ever before. 
Indeed, the Court was a focal point of the 2016 presidential cam-
paign. Following the sudden death of Antonin Scalia, Democrats 
and Republicans divided over the propriety of President Obama's 
appointing a successor during an election year-exposing a deep, di-
visive gulf between the parties over the very issues that divide the 
Justices. 3 Democratic candidates Hillary Rodham Clinton and Bernie 
Sanders spoke both of President Obama's constiUitional responsibility 
to fil l the Scalia seat and of their having a "litmus test" for Supreme 
Court nominees to overUirn what Sanders called the "disastrous" 
Citizens United ru.ling;·f Republican candidates Donald Trump, Marco 
Rubio, Jeb Bush, and Ted Cruz backed Senate Republican efforts to 
block an Obama nominee, proclaimed the 2016 election a "referen-
dmn" on the Supreme Court, and spoke of the need for "future Su-
preme Court[s]" to tmdo the Roberts Court's decisions on the M-
fordable Care Act and same-sex marriage.5 Correspondingly, after 
' For~ s~mpling of post-2 010 5-4 decisions along party lines, see note 62. 
·' For discussions of the political import of Sca lia's successor and the effor ts of Republican 
Senators to block any Obama nominee to the Court, see 1-fmv Anton in Scalia Changed Amerim, 
Politico (Feb 14, 20 16), archived at https:l/perrna.cc/JP48-LREG; Michael D. Shear and 
j ennifer Steinhauer, !vlore RepublicmJ>" Say TIJey'/1 Block Sup1·eme Conn Nomination, NY Times 
(Feb 15, 20 16), archived at https:l/perma.cc/Jh>S9-SP23. Before Scalia's death, the Court was 
an emerging election issue; the advanced age of severa l Justices and the Court's poli tica lly 
charged docket contribmed to its electoral signi ficance. See Richard Wolf, Aging Supreme 
Court Euergizes Republimns ivlore tbrm Demo<Tflts in 2016 Race, USA Today (Oct 25, 2015), 
archived at https://penna.cc/FC5A-F4SQ; Tony Mauro, SCOTUS v. Presidemial Rnce, Nat! 
L J (Jan 4, 20 16), archived at https:l/perma .cc/HD9S-HFSX; Adam Liptak, Supn:me Cmm 
Takes on Pulit.imlly Cbmged Cases, NY Times (Oct 4, 2015), archived at hnps://perma.cc 
/VZ8D-4C I 'B. 
' John Wagner and Anne Gcaran, Clinton, Sanden Agree on Tbis Niud; in Colomdo: GOP 
Shouldn 't I,Vait Oil Smlia Neplact:ment, Wash Post (Feb 13, 2016), archived at https:!/perma.cc 
/M5 DQ-QXNJ; Manea Gold and Anne Gearan, 1-Jillm)' Clinton '.r Litmw· Test for Supreme 
Courr. Nominees: A Pledge to Ovett:um Citizens United, Wash Post (May 14, 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/6 U4S-NEV/T (quoting Sanders) . C linton also spoke of having a "bunch of 
li tmus tests," including gay ri gh t~ and tl1e Voting Rights Act. Sec Jonathan Easley, Clinton: "1 
Have 11 /Jmn-b ofLitunJs Tests"jor Supmne Court Nominee,·, The [--ti ll (Feb 3, 2016), archived at 
https://penna.cc/VEZ8-FPW9. 
' j on:1t11an Ma rtin, Republium Candidates Unite Against Obmna Replacing Smlia, NY Times 
(Feb 13, 2016), arch ived at lmps:l/perma .cc/BRA5-BV3D; Liz Fields, Marco Rubio Says He 
i-Ias a Plan to Make Ga)' Mm-rirrge 11/egalllgain, Vice News (Dec 14, 20 15), archjved at https:// 
perma.cc/[-l6ZR-TDKA (quoting Rubio) ; Bob Egelko, 'fmmp, Rubio Weigb in on Supreme 
Courr Abmd of Debme, San Francisco C hronicle (Dec 14, 20 15), archived at lmps://perma.cc 
/HA2T -YFS3; Ka tie Zezima, Ted Cnr:. Ca!Lr for Judicial Retention Elm ions of Supn:tne Court 
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securing their party's nomination, Clinton and Tnm1p continued to 
highlight the Republican-Democratic Supreme Court divide. They 
repeatedly called attention to the Court and, with it, party differences 
on gun control, inmugration, health care, abortion, campaign finance, 
and voter identification laws.6 
This article documents that today's Court is different from past 
Courts in the linkage between party and ideology. More important, 
it offers an explanation for this development. That explanation is 
based on the growth in polarization among political elites-polari-
zation that has shaped the Court in multiple ways and that is likely to 
continue. 
One key element of polarization is partisan sorting, in which con-
servatives increasingly nugrate to the Republican Party and liberals 
to the Democratic Party. Among political elites, the ideological dis-
tance between Democrats and Republicans is perhaps greater today 
than at any other time in the nation's history. 7 Because of partisan 
sorting, the party leaders who participate in the selection of Justices 
and the pools of prospective non1inees to the Court are more ideo-
logically homogeneous. 
A second key element of polarization is growing ideological con-
sciousness among the selectors of]ustices and the Justices themselves. 
Political elites have become more sharply divided into ideological 
Justices, \Jifash Post (June 27 , 201 5), nt https:l/www.washingtonpost.com/ news/post-politics 
/wp/2 0 I 5/06/2 7 ted -cruz-ca li s- for-judicinl -reten cion-elections-for-supreme -court-.! ustices/; 
Katie Zezima, Cmz Wrmtl' w J\!fnke 201611 Refermdml! on tbe Supreme Court: l-Ie's Ahwrry• Done 
It, \Vash Post (Feb 15, 20 16), at https:l/www.wnshingtonpost.com/ news/post-poli tics/wp 
12 016/ 02/ I 5 I cruz-wants -to-make-2 0 16-a -referendum-on- the-supreme-court-hes-al ready 
-done- it/? utm_term = .7935 1 3a5cand. 
'· For general discussions of differences in party platforms and campaigns, see Melanie 
Mason and Chris Megerian, How tbe Democmtic and Republimn Part:y Plntjimm Srnck Up on 
Climate Cbange, Inm, 1111d !Wore Key lmtes, LA T imes (July 27, 20 16), ava ilable at http://www 
.Ia ti mes.com/pol.i tics/la -na -pol-democra ts- repu bl.icans-pla tfonns-2 016072 7 -snap-hun !story 
.hun!; Jonathan D . Salant, 10 Huge Dijfereuws Bcnveen Dmwonuic and Republimn Plmfrmlls, 
nj.com (July 28, 2016), ava ilable at http://www.nj .com/ politics/index.ssf/2 0 16/07 /dnc_20 16 
_ I O_big_ways_the_democratic_pla tform_difle.html; Richard vVolf, Sup1·e11u Cmn-t Debate: 
Sttn ·k Commsts Emerge Bmvem Tmmp, Climou, USA Today (Oct 20, 20 16), available at 
htq:>:l /www. usa today .com/story/news/politics/ e lections/20 16/ I 012 01 supreme-coun -deba te 
-cl inton-u·tunp-guns-abonjon/92452362; Dahlia Lithwick and Mark .Joseph Stern , Wbo Will 
Protea tbe Con.rtirmion? Donald "Tmmp vs. Hillary Climon, Amendmcllt by Ammt!ment, Slate 
(Oct 30, 20 16), available at hnp://www.slate .com/articles/news_and_poli tics/jurisprudence 
12016/ 1 0/who_ will_protect_the_constimtion_donald_m unp_or_hi llary _clinton .hunl. 
7 Measures of congressiona l voti ng pattem s show that the ideological di stance between 
Democrats and Republicans is greater today than at any other time in our nation's h.isrory 
(see fig . 3); see generally Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Sepamtion of Prmies, Not 
Powers, 1!9 H arv L Rev 23 11 (2006). 
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camps that view each other with hostility, a process that has been 
labeled affective polarization. A In part, this development is tied to the 
ideological sorting of Democrats and RepublicansY Affective polar-
ization does not necessarily mean that conservatives and liberals are 
farther apart than they were in the past. Rather, it means that indi-
vidua ls are more conscious of being in an ideological camp that is 
opposed to the competing camp. 
We analyze the impact of political polarization on the Court largely 
in terms of elite social networks. Polarization is reflected in the social 
networks that are critical to grooming and identifying appointees to 
the federal courts, including the Supreme Court. 10 It also pervades 
the social networks of which the Justices themselves are a part; con-
servative Republican-appointedjustices interact with elites who sup-
port conservative outcomes and liberal Democratic-appointed Jus-
tices interact with elites who support Liberal outcomes. 11 
In highl ighting the profound impact of party polarization on to-
day's Court, we contrast the current period with earlier periods. 
Even a few decades ago, the world in which the Justices lived and 
worked was more homogeneous than it is today, with a center-left tilt 
among academic and media elites. This social environment probably 
helps to account for an apparent drift to the left by Republican-
appointed Justices such as John Paul Stevens, David Souter, andes-
pecia lly Harry Blackmun. 12 Today, the elite world has become ideo-
• See Shamo Iyengar, G:mrav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes, Ajj"ect, Not Ideolo&'J'' A So,·ial 
ldemity PmyJective ou Po/m·iztttion, 76 Pub Opin ion Q 405,406 (2 012); Patrick R. Mi ller and 
P<uncla J ohnston Conover, Red and Blue States of Mind: Partisan Hostility fl)/[1 Voting in tbe 
United States, 68 Pol Research Q 225 (2 01 5). Affective polari zation is also seen iJl the in-
creas ing acrimony between members of opposition parties on talk shows and on the floor of 
Congress. See Danny Hayes, Tbe Wonl•· f-lmt Model ofPolllrization, \Nash Post (Jan 6, 2013), 
archived at https://penna.cc/57YS-3GZ8 . 
. , Cass R. SunsLein, Ptn-tyi.l't/1 N01v Tnnnps R11ci.mt, Bloomberg View (Sept 22, 20 14), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/4CQW-FY9E. 
1
° For an insightfu l Lreatment of effor ts by the Reagan Justice Deparunent to groom young 
conservatives for judgeships, sec Steven Tcles, 71 ·an.•fomllltive Bumwcml]': l?e11gau's Lmvyers 
and tbe Dynamics ofl'o!itiml luvcsrment, 23 Studies in Am Pol Dev 61 (2009). 
11 On the importance of d1ese social networks to judicial decision making, sec Sect.ion fV.A. 
See genera lly Lawrence 13:mm, .Judges 11ml Their Audiwces: A Perspeaive on .Judicial Bebavim· 
(Princeton, 2006). 
"See Lawrence Baum and Neal D evins, Wby tbe Su.pnme Comt Cares about Elites 111111 Not 
rbe Ameriwn People, 98 Georgetown L J 15 15, 1574- 79 (20 10). To a degree, the appearance 
of a movement to the left by Justices such as Blackm un and Stevens is a product of d1 e 
righLward movement of the Court as a whole wid1 the appointments of new Justices. Indeed, 
Stevens and (to a lesser degree) Blackmun cited d1at r ightward movement as the source of 
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logically polarized, so that Justices on both the left and right are 
part of social networks that reinforce conservatism for Republican-
appointed Justices and liberalism for Democratic-appointed Justices. 
Of particular importance, conservative elites have consciously sought 
to overcome what they see as a liberal bias in the legal system, in-
cluding the courts. That effort is reflected in the rise of the Federa list 
Society and the related establishment of a conservative legal net-
work.1 3 
Our analysis does not speak to how libera l a Court with a 
D emocratic-appointed majority would be or how conservative a Court 
with a Republican-appointed majority would be, because a range of 
circumstances can affect the Court's ideological center of gravity. 1.1 
But the changes in the Court that we describe have had a tendency to 
move it to the right, because Republican appointees on the whole are 
now more conservative than in the past while Democratic appointees 
as a group have not changed appreciably.15 Our analysis shows that 
their apparent change. J effi·ey Rosen, lnmview Tmnscript: Jusr.ice John Paul Stevws, NY 
T imes Magazine (April 12, 2010); Moyers & Company, ln Seanb of tbe Con.rtitmion: 
Mr. Justice ll/ackunm, April 16, 1987, at lmv://billmoyers.com/content.mr-Justice-bl:lckmun 
-supreme-court!. However, several appointees of Republican presidents who joined the 
Court between 1953 and 1990 showed a movement to the left dming the ir Court tenure 
based on their votes on case outcomes even with. controls for the voting of the sa rne col-
leag·ues over ti me. Baum, Judges and Tbeh· Audiwces at 148 (c ited in note I 1). Rates of 
agreement with the same opinions show a similar pattern. For instance, lllackmw1 agreed 
with C hief Justice Burger 23 percentage points more often than he agreed with Justice 
Brennan in the 1970- 79 Terms but agreed with Brennan 12 percentage points more often 
than with Burger in the 1980- 85 T erms; Stevens agreed with Brennan I percentage point 
more often than with Justice Rehnguist in the 1976-78 Terms and 14 percentage poin ts more 
often in rl1e 1979- 85 Terms; Somer agreed wirl1 Justice Sca lia II percentage points more 
often rll<lll with Stevens in the 1990-92 Terms but agreed wirl1 Stevens 21 percentage poin ts 
more o ften than with Sca lia in rl1c 1993- 2004 Terms. Agreement rates were calcula ted from 
data in Tl1c Statistics, Harv L Rev, published mmually in rl1 e November issue. 
' J See Steven M. Teles, Tbe Rise oftbe Couselvative Legal !Wovemeut: 7/;c Battle for Comrol of 
tbe Lrnv (Princeton, 2008); Am:mda Hollis-Brusky, ltlws <vitb Consequences: Tbe Fedemlist 
Society and tbe Coumvmive Coumerrevolutiou (Oxford, 20 15). 
14 Today's Court does not have a sharper conservative-li beral divide than past Courts; what 
disti nguishes it is that ideological divisions coincide wirl1 partisan divisions. On u·encls in 
ideological polar ization , see Tom S. Clark, Measuring Ideological Polari::,ation on tbe United 
Swtes Supreme CmM, 62 Pol Research Q 146 (2009); Donald Michael Gooch, ldeologiml 
Polm·izrttiou ou tbe Supreme Court: Trmd• in the Com·t's 1ustitutioual Envirom11e11t and fkros.r 
Regi111es, 1937- 2008, 43 Am Pol Research 999 (20 15). 
'
5 In Part I, we highlight how it is rl1at today's Democrats are all moderate liberals as 
compared to earlier Courts where there were su·ong libera l Democra ts as well as more 
conservative Democrats. In Part II, we link rlus phenomenon to the appointment strategies of 
Democratic presidents . In so doing, we explain why Democrats on today's Court are ,, bout 
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the growing ideological gap between Democratic-appointed Justices 
and Republican-appointed Justices is largely attributable to the ap-
pointment of conservative Republican nominees. 10 
In this article we point to the ways that polarization in the larger 
world of political and social eli tes has reshaped the Court. But in 
doing so, we do not ignore the differences between the Court and the 
other branches. 17 For one thing, the Justices' partial insulation from 
partisan constituencies gives them more freedom to depart from the 
ideological positions that those constituencies subscribe to in par-
ticular cases, and their embrace of the norm of judicial independence 
enhances that freedom. 1H Further, the Justices' preference for con-
sensus where it is possible reduces the impact of ideological divisions 
on some decisions.19 
Finally, and perhaps most important, Justices decide cases in legal 
terms. As a result, ideological considerations often do not figure into 
the Court's decision making.20 Then-Senator Barack Obama un-
derlined this reali ty when he voted against confirmation of Chief 
Justice John Roberts not because of the "95 percent of the cases" that 
equa lly liberal as those on earl ier Courts but less ideologica lly diverse (see fi gs . 1 and 2). See 
also Dav id Strauss, Tbe Last. Liberal Jtmicer, 21 Democracy 11 4 (2 011) (noting that some 
libera ls think there "have been no tru ly progressive Justices on the Court for many years"); 
J effrey Rosen, Wbat 's a Libeml Justice N01v?, NY T imes Magazine, M..M:SO (May 26, 2009) 
(noting differences between vVarren-cra libera lism and libera lism today). 
'"See Section N.C. 
17 Thomas Keck has presented ev idence tha t on four seL~ of controversial issues, voting 
differences between Repub li ca ns and Democra ts in Congress arc substantially greater than 
voti ng differences in the Supreme Court :md the federa l courts of appeals. Thomas Keck, 
Judicial Politics in Polarized Times 147- 50 (Chicago, 20 14). 
'" Justice i\ntonin Scalia , for example, took great pride in casting "liberal" votes on flag 
burning, search and seizure, and other issues because of his commitment to a set o f inter-
pretive principles that transcend ideology. Sec Margot Ta lbot, Supreme Coufit!em·e, New 
Yorker (Ma r 28, 2005), archived at hnvs:!/perma.cc/E7GC-HUMT. Correspondingly, to 
the extent that today's Justices have an incentive to demonsu·ate that partisanship does not 
imp:lct their decision making, the partisan divide on today's Court may moderate Court 
decision making in ways tha t the ea rlier conserva tive- libera l divide did not moderate decision 
making. For a general treatment of this topic, sec Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Tbe P.•y,·hology of 
tbe Supreme Coun lll- 15 (Oxford , 2006). 
'" See Pamela C. Corley, Amy Steigerwalt, and Artemus \Vard, Tbe Puzzle of Unanimity: 
ConJmms 011 the United Stlltes Supreme Court 161 (Stanford Law Books, 2013); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Uuauimit.)' aud Disagreement ou the Supreme Comt, 100 Cornell L Rev 769 (2015). 
'" For a provocative study on how Roberts Court Justices are divided on methodological as 
well as ideologica l grou nds (and how it is that methodological preferences sometimes prevail), 
see J oshua B. Fischman and TonjaJ acobi, The Sewnd Dim~:usiou oftbe Sup1·mw Com1, 57 Wm & 
Mary L Hev 1671. (20 16). 
8] SPLIT DEFINITIVE 307 
would be decided as a matter of law but because of the "5 percent of 
cases that are truly difficult."2 1 
For those reasons, we do not expect the Justices always to cast votes 
that match their ideological and partisan affiliations. Chief Justice 
Roberts's votes in both the 2012 and 2015 Affordable Care Act de-
cisions are prominent examples,22 but these votes do not mean that 
the Chief justice is a moderate or a liberal; he is clearly a conser-
vative.23 Likewise, just because the Justices sometimes issue unani-
mous opinions on issues that divide conservatives and liberals out-
side the Court does not mean that today's Court transcends partisan 
labels.H Republican-appointed Justices are conservative notwith-
standing the fact that all nine Justices agreed that the police cannot 
search digital information on a cellphone without a warrant; corre-
spondingly, Democratic-appointed Justices are liberal notwithstand-
ing the Court's unanimous ruling that the Constitution excludes 
ministers from the protections of employment discrimination IawsY 
21 Nomination of J ohn Roberts, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept 22, 2005), in 15 1 Cong Rec 
21032 (remarks of Senator Obama); Mark Tushnet, In tbe Balance: La:w awl Politics on tbe 
Robe11s Coun xiv (W. \ i\1. Norton, 20 13) (expressing agreement with Obama). 
"Natio11al Federario11 ufhulepwdem Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566 (20 12); King v Bunvell, 
135 S Ct 2480 (2015). See David G. Savage, Chief]ustice Robms Signals Tbat Supreme Com·t 
l?emains lndepmdem, LA T imes Al (June 30, 2012). 
'-' See notes 252- 57 and accompan)'ing text. For identica l reasons, Justices Stephen l3reyer 
and E lena Kagan are clearly libera l notwithstanding the fact that they joined the Court's 
Republ icans in findin g the ;Vfordable Care Act's Medicaid extension unconstitutional. 
14 See generally Sunstein, 100 Cornell L Rev (cited in note 19). 
25 Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473 (2 014) (cell phone searches); Hosrm1w-111bor Evangeliwl 
Lutbemit Clmrci; & Scbool v EEOC, 132 S Ct 694 (2012) (recognizing ministerial exception to 
employment discrimination legislation). Moreover, tl1e Court sometimes masks deep divi-
sions among tl1e justices by issuing narrow unanimous or near-unanimous rulings tl1at defer 
decision on deeply divisive issues. Examples include the Court's unanimous 2009 ruling in 
Northwest !lusrin Mmlicipal Utility District No. I v Holder, 557 US 193 (2009) (deferring de-
cision on tl1e constitutionality of tl1e preclearance requirements of tl1e Voting Rights Act), tl1e 
Court's 7- l ruling in Fisber v Uuivenity of Texas, 13 3 S Ct 2411 (20 1 3) (deferring decision on 
University of Texas affirmative action program), and tl1e Court's unanimous ruling in Zubil< v 
/Junve/1, 136 S Ct 15 57 (2016) (inviting the parties to resolve a dispute over contraceptive 
coverage in cenai n hea ltl1 plans). Some unanimous rulings fean1re sharp disagreements on 
doctrinal matters. Examples include McCullm v Coal<ley, 134 S Ct 2518 (2014) (a llowable 
regulation of protest activities at abortion clinics), NLRB v Noel Cauuing, 134 S Ct 2250 (2014) 
(scope of presidential recess appoinunent power), and Boud v Uuitctl State.,·, 134 S Ct 2077 (2014) 
(reach of federal power to implement treaties tl1l'ough legislation). The proportion of unanimous 
decisions in recent terms is typically between 40 and 50 percent, and it was about two-tl1irds in the 
2013 Term. See Sta tistics, SCOTUSblog, Imv:!/www.scol11Sblog.com/statistics/. T llis frequent 
agreement among tl1c Justices underlines tl1e difference between tl1e Supreme Court and Con-
gress noted in this paragraph . 
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This article is organized as follows: Part I documents that the 
contemporary Court is the first Court to be divided sharply along 
partisan lines by examining historical patterns of division on the 
Court. Part II examines the growth in polarization in government 
and in the broader political elite. It also points to the implications of 
that polarization for the Court. 
The remainder of the article examines those implications in greater 
detail. Part III examines how polarization has affected the appoint-
ments of Supreme Court Justices. It emphasizes differences in the 
appointment strategies of Democratic and Republican presidents, 
differences that reflect the rise of the conservative legal movement 
and its impact on the grooming and identification of conservative 
nominees. It therefore explains why Republican appointees to the 
Court in the current era are distinctly more conservative as a group 
than their predecessors, while today's Democratic appointees are 
a bout as liberal as their predecessors. zr. 
Part IV turns to sitting Justices. It uses social psychology to ex-
plain further why today's party polarization has resulted in partisan 
voting patterns by the Justices, focusing on the impact of elite social 
networks in judicial decision making. Here, too, we probe differ-
ences between the parties. During the 1960s through 1980s, the dom-
inant legal elite culture pushed Republican-appointed Justices away 
from the right and toward the center-left. Today, however, Justices 
are less prone to drift and, with no post-1990 Republican-appointed 
Justice moving to the center-left, there has been a hardening of the 
right. 
Part V briefly considers the ramifications of all thjs: why presi-
dential elections matter more for the Court today than ever before; 
why the Court is likely to move more sharply to the right or left de-
pending on whether there is a majority of Democratic or Republican 
appointees; and, correspondingly, why-after Justice Kennedy-
there is not likely to be a "super-median" Justice27 who sometimes 
sides with conservatives and other times with liberals in the Court's 
most divisive opinions. 
Following Part V, we will consider how the nomination and con-
finnation of Neil Gorsuch reinforce our central claim. 
16 See figure 2 (comparing historic means of Democratic and Republican appointees). 
" Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi, Super Median,-, 6 1 Stan L Rev 37 (2008). 
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I. PARTY AND IDEOLOGY IN SuPREME CouRT HisToRY 
On the current Supreme Court, ideological lines coincide 
with party lines: since Elena Kagan succeeded John Paul Stevens in 
2010, every Justice who was appointed by a Democratic president has 
had a more liberal voting record than every Republican appointee. In 
the 2010-15 Terms of the Court, the Justice appointed by aDem-
ocratic president who cast the highest proportion of conservative 
votes (43.5 percent) was Stephen Breyer; the Justice appointed by a 
Republican president who cast the lowest proportion of conservative 
votes (53.4 percent) was Anthony Kennedy. 28 
The coincidence of party and ideology on today's Court has been 
widely noted/ 9 but the departure from traditional patterns on the 
Court is not as well recognized. This is the first period in which the 
Court has been sharply divided between substantial blocs of]ustices 
from each of the two major political parties. To demonstrate this 
difference, we will ana lyze ideological differences among Justices 
over time. We divide our analysis into two periods: 1801- 1937 and 
193 7- 2016. During the first period,30 we look principally to historical 
studies of the Court and our own analysis of dissenting opinions 
in landmark cases. For the 1937- 2016 period, we look primarily to 
Martin-Quinn scores, which are available beginning with the 193 7 
Term, as measures of the Justices' ideological positions.31 
'" T hese percentages are based on analysis of data in the Supreme Court Database, http:// 
scdb.wusrl. edu/. vVe analyzed cases decided after oral argument (decision type = 1, 6, or 7) . 
T he criteria for coding votes as liberal or conservative are described at lmp://scdb.wusrl.edu 
/documentation.php?var = decisionDirection. 
A similar pattern exists for the Martin-Quinn scores, in which higher scores indicate 
greater conservatism. In the mean Martin-Q uinn scores across the 2010- 14 Terms, Justice 
Kennedy had cl1e lowest score for a Republican at + 0.07; Justice Breyer had d1 e highest 
score for a Democrat at - 1.41; the nine Justices' scores ranged from + 3. 14 to -2 .34. See 
table I for a deta iling of Justices' rankings by Martin-Quinn scores over ti me; for addi-
tional discussion of Martin-Quinn scores, see note 31. 
20 Sec, for example, G reg Stohr, Raben,· Supreme Court's Prmisan Split Sbmvs Ne7v .Justices 
A1'e Prediaable, Bloomberg News (July 1, 2011), at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20 11 
-07-0 I /roberts-supreme-cou rr-s-partisa n-spli t-shows-new-J ustices-are-predicta ble.h nnl ; 
Adam Liptak, Tbe Polarized Cou11, NY T imes, SR I (May 11 , 2014) (discussing, inter alia, 
find ings in an ea rlier version of the smdy that is the basis of cl1is article). 
30 W e do not consider rl1 e l789- 1800 period, a time when rl1e Court was headed by three 
di fferent C hief Justices and issued very few opinions and when all the Justices were appoin ted 
by Federalist presidents. 
3
' T he Ma rtin -Quinn scores are based on a u·ansformation of d1e patterns of interagree-
rnent on votes among me Justices, without n priori labeling of their ideological direction and 
with a procedure thnt is design ed to minimize rl1e impact of random Auctuations in rl1e Jus-
310 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2016 
A. THE PERIOD BEFORE 1937 
T hroughout the period that ended in 193 7, there is little evidence 
of partisan division within the Court. Indeed, it is difficult to trace 
patterns of division at all. Dissent was infrequent, and the Justices 
typically spoke with one voice (issuing unanimous opinions for the 
Court).n In part, this refl ected the common practice of suppressing 
dissenting views in the Court's final votes on the merits.31 Moreover, 
as in the federal courts of appeals today, 34 many of the mandatory 
cases that constituted a large share of the Court's docket until 192 5 
t.ices' voti ng From term to term that resul ts fTom the specific mix of cases tha t the Court hears . 
T he procedure was first set om in a 2002 article and is widely used in research on the Supreme 
Court. See Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Q uinn, Dyna'lllic Ideal Poiut E:rtimrttiou virt Markov 
Chain Mome Cal'!o for rbe U.S. Supre'll!e Co1m 1953- 1999, 10 Pol Anal ys is 134 (2002); Brandon 
Barte ls, Tbe Conrtmining Capacity of Legal Doctrine on tbc U.S. Supreme Court, 103 Am Pol Sci 
Rev 474 (2009); Lee Epste in and W illiam M. Landes, Was Tlm·e Eve1· Sucb a Thing as]udidal 
SeiFRestraimf, 100 Cal L Rev 557 (2012); W illiam M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational 
] ut!icial Bebavior: A Swtistical Stu1~y, 1 J Legal Analysis 775 (20 10). It sho uld be noted that the 
Martin-Quinn scores are not fully linea r, so that the dism nces between different pairs of]ustices 
are not necessarily comparable. Daniel E . Ho and Kevin J\11. Quinn, fluw Not to Lie witb ] udidal 
Votes: Misconceptions, Measttn'lnent, and !Vlot/eL,·, 98 CalL Rev 813, 846- 47 (201 0). 
We use the Manin-Quinn scores rather than scores based on ideological coding of votes in 
the Supreme Court Database because they extend several terms further than the currently 
ava ilable da ta in tl1e da tabase (the 1937 Term ratl1er tl1 an tl1e 1946 Term) and because tl1eir 
properties make tl1em somewhat better indicators o f tlle Court's ideo logical lineup. A division 
at the 1937 Term is sensible for another reason: 1937 is considered tl1e start of tl1e modern 
Coun. ln I 937, the "old Court" acquiesced to tl1e New D eal and Franklin D elano Roosevel t 
was able tO appoint his first (out of eight) Supreme Court Justice . See \Nill iam E. Leuch ten-
bu rg, 7/;e Sup1·w1e Court Rebom: The Constiw.tional Revolution iu tbe Age of Roosevelt (Oxford, 
I 996). T he yea r I 93 7 also corresponds tO Congress's decision to grant tl1e Court discretionary 
certiorari power in I 925 , legisla tion tl1a t allowed tl1e Court to assume a broader role expound-
ing lega l principles. See Tara Leigh G rove, The E:r:ceptious Claus,; as a StTucwral Saji:gurml, 
11 3 Colum L Rev 929, 93 1-3 2, 948-78 (2013). For other prominent academic studies tl1 at 
treat 1. 937 as the transforma tive year separating the o ld Court [Tom tl1e modern Court, see 
13ruce Ackerman, We tbe People: Foundations (Belknap, 1993); T homas M . Keck, Tbe Most 
Activi.,·t Supreme Court in E-listo1y (Chicago, 2004). 
" In tl1e period from l80l through 1938, at most tl1ere were four terms in one era ( l 836, 
l845, 1852, 1854) in which more than 20 percent o f the Court's decisions in cluded dissenting 
opinions. Lee E pstein eta!, Tbe Supreme Coun Compeudium: Dara, Decisions and Developments 
227- 30 (CQ Press, 4th eel 2007). See also Sunstein , 100 Cornell L Rev at 773- 84 (cited in 
note l 9). 
" Alexander M. Bickel, Tbe Unpubliibed Opinions of Mr. ]ustice Brandeis: Tbe Supreme Court 
at Hlork (T-larva rd, l957); Lee Epstein eta!, Tbe N01m ofCousen.ms 011 tbe U.S. Sup1·eme Com·t, 
45 Am J Pol Sci 362 (2 00 l ); Ro bert Post, Tbe Supreme Coun Opinion as Jusriw tional Practice: 
Dissent, Legal Scbolm:rbip, mul Decisiomnaking in rbe Taft Court, 85 Minn L Rev 1267, 1331- 55 
(2 00 I). 
H Harry T. Edwards and M ichael A. Live rmore, Pitjitlh ~(Empiriml Swtlies Tbat Attempt to 
Undmtmul tbe Frmm Affecting Appellate Decisiomnaking, 58 Duke L J 1895, l950- 58 (2009). 
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were "easy" and therefore unlikely to provoke disagreement among 
the Justices. 
When the Justices did disagree, those disagreements did not tend 
to break along party lines.35 One piece of evidence for the lack of 
polarization can be derived from a listing of the Court's most im-
portant decisions in the Guide to the U.S. Sup1'eme Court. 36 Of the 
seventy-five most important decisions between 1790 and 193 7 in 
which there were at least two dissenting votes, in only one were all of 
the Justices on one side appointed by presidents of one party and all 
of the Justices on the other side appointed by presidents of the other 
party.37 Consider, for example, two of the most noteworthy cases 
from this period, 01'ed Scottv Sandfo1'd (1857) and Locbnerv Ne1v Y01,·k 
(1905). In D1'ed Scott, the two dissenters were the Whig-appointed 
Benjamin Curtis and the Democratic-appointed John McLean;'H 
in Loclmer, Justices appointed by both Democratic and Republican 
presidents were in both the majority and the dissent, and Justices 
35 Prior to 1910, there is little research tl1at systematica lly analyzes disagreements among 
the Justices. The Legacy Supreme Court Database includes data on tl1e .Justices' votes in all 
decisions in tl1e 1790-1945 Terms. From the la te 1860s on, tl1ere were enough nonunani -
mous decisions to allow meaningful analysis of voting patterns. When tlw Justices' votes in 
the non unanimous decisions are characteri zed in terms of tl1e database coding of ideology, 
there were no terms between 1867 and 1909 in which tl1ere were at least two Justices 
appointed by presidents of each party and all the Juscices from one party had more liberal 
records tl1an all tl1e Juscices from tl1e other party. T his finding should not be given undue 
weight, because tl1e numbers of nonunanimous decisions tl1at could be coded as liberal or 
conserv;ltive were as low as nine or ten in some terms and because tl1e definitjons of liberal 
and conservative positions in tl1e current era do not necessarily capn.1 re possible lines of 
division in tl1e late nineteentl1 century. The dam base and its definiti ons of liberal and con-
servative positions are cited in note 28. 
J6 David G . Savage, Guide to tbe U.S. Supreme Conn 1276- 94 (CQ Press, 5tll ed2010). T he 
criteria for selection of important cases were not made explicit in tl1e successive editions of 
tl1e Guide, and mere are bi<lses and id iosyncras ies in that se lection . Still, tl1e list in tl1e Guide is 
a good and substamial sampling of decisions that can be considered important, and it is 
unique in covering tl1e fu ll hi story of tl1e Supreme Court. For evaluations of tlw list, sec Saul 
Brenner, iVIa)o1·ity Opiuion A,)·igmncnt iu Salient Cases on tbe U.S. Supreme Com·t: Are No"'V 
As.wcinre Justices Assigned Ftnver Opinions?, 22 Just Sys J 209, 212 n 4 (200 1); Beverly Blair 
Cook, Mermtt·ing tbe Signiftmnce of U.S. Supt·e111e Court Decisions, 55 J Pol 11 27, 11 32, 11 36 
(1993); Lee Epste in and Jeffrey A. Segal, Mea.l'ltriug ll'me Salience, 44 Am] Pol Sci 66, 68- 71 
(2000). 
37 T hat decision was United State.,· v Texas, 143 US 621 (1892). T he dissenters were Dem-
ocra tS Melville Fu ller and Lucius Lamar. 
" 19 How 393 (1857). Dred Scott was hardly an anomaly. Even during Reconstmction 
(when tl1e parties were highly polarized), Republicans and D emocrats joined rogetl1er to issue 
unanimous decisions on tmjor postwar issues. See Ex Pane Mo·Crmlle, 7 ' Va ll 506 (1869); 
Missi,)·ippi v ]olmson, 4 Wall 475 (1867). 
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John Harlan and Oliver Wendell Holmes broke ranks with the other 
Republican-appointed Justices in voting to uphold the challenged 
economic regulation. 3 ~ 
Quantitative analyses of the Justices' voting behavior are available 
for the full period beginning with the Court's 1910 Term.40 Donald 
Carl Leavitt's study of the White Court (1910- 21) used the Justices' 
votes to calculate scores on ideological scales for the 1910- 15 and 
1916-20 Terms. In neither period were the Court's Republican- and 
Democratic-appointed Justices separated from each other ideologi-
cally; most notably, Democratic president Woodrow Wilson's ap-
pointee James McReynolds (1914-41) took positions that were rel-
atively and increasingly conservative.4 1 
Eloise C. Snyder tracked agreements and disagreements among 
the Justices and used analysis of votes to identify what she called 
ideological "cliques" for each "natural Court"42 from 1921 to 1937.43 
At no time were all the Justices appointed by Democratic presidents 
in separate cliques from all the Justices appointed by Republican 
presidents.44 In cases dealing with New Deal programs that sharply 
w 198 US 45 (1905). See also Owen M. Fiss, Oliver Weudell Holmes Devise Hisw1y of tbe 
United States Supreme Coun-: Tro!lblet! Beginnings of tbe !Vlodem State, 1888- 1910, 35 (Cam-
bridge, 1993) (concluding that there was no ideological divide between Democrats and 
Republicans of tllis period). 
·•o These ana lyses begin wi tl1 agreements and disagreements of tl1e Justices in individual 
cases and use statistica l tech niques to place each Justice on a unidimensional scale for par-
ticular time periods. Although rhe votes used in these analyses are not labeled ideologica lly, 
tl1e sca les can be interpreted in ideological terms because patterns of agreement and dis-
agreement tend to refl ect a dominant ideological dimension. See Bernard Grofman and 
Ti mothy J. flrazill , Identi{yiug the lvledirm Jusr.ice on tbe Supreme Coun: Tbroug-b !'vlultidimcn-
sioual Smling: Aua6•sis of"Natuml Cmm s" 1953- 1991, 11 3 Pub Choice 55 (2002). 
'" Donald Carl Leavitt, i lttiuules rmd Ideology on tbe White Supreme Court 1910- 1920, · 186 
(PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 1970). Leavil1: undertook several dimensional 
ana lyses of the Justices' votes; we relied primarily on the first principal axis lo:1d ing in Q-
analyses of votes. Another analysis of voti ng in the 1916- 2 1 Terms tound a similar pattern. 
Roger Handberg, Decision-Making in a Natuml Coun, 1916- 1921, 4 Am Pol Q 357, 365 
(1976). Chief justice Wh ite might be classified as a Democrat because of ]lis own party af-
fi li ation and his ini tial appointment by President Cleveland, or as a Republican because of his 
elevation to C hief Justi ce by President W illiam Howard Taft. In Leavitt's analysis, vVhite 
stood somewha t to the left mnong his colleagues in tl1e 1910- 15 Terms and somewhat to me 
right in tl1e 1916- 2 1 Terms. 
·I! A naLUral Court is a period during which the Court's membership is unchanged. 
43 Eloise C. Snyder, Tbe Supre111e Com1 as a S?llal! Gmup, 36 Soc Forces 232, 235 (1958). 
T he Snyder study, based on a subset of cases, extended to 1953. 
"' The best known of the nat1.1ral Couns in that period was tl1e Court tlu1t sat in tl1e 1932-
36 Terms, the one that coll ectively ca rne into severe con flict witl1 President Franklin 
Roosevelt during his first term in o i'fice. T hat Court split along lines tl1at cut across p:1rty. 
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divided the Court, the Court's two Democratic-appointed Justices 
(Louis Brandeis andJ ames McReynolds) were in opposing camps and 
the Justices appointed by Republican presidents were also divided.4; 
Without question, then, Supreme Court decision making tran-
scended party-line divisions throughout the 1801-193 7 period. That 
is not to say that party identity was irrelevant to the Court's decision 
making;4o presidents sometimes appointed Justices with an eye to-
ward advancing their party's policy agenda .47 Nonetheless, all avail-
able evidence suggests that the Court's decision making did not track 
party lines. 
B. T HE PERIOD SINCE 1937 
For the period beginning with the 193 7 Term, the Martin-Quinn 
scores can be used to trace the relationship between party and ide-
ology by allowing us to array the Justices from left to right in each 
term of the Court. As these arrays show, before 2 010 the Court never 
divided along strictly partisan lines. It came closest to a full split 
between Republican and Democratic appointees in the 1941- 44 
T erms. Seven of the nine Justices had been appointed by Democrat 
Franklin Roosevelt; Owen Roberts and Chief Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone had been appointed by Republican Calvin Coolidge (although 
Stone had been elevated to Chief Justice by Roosevelt). T lu·oughout 
that period, Roberts was the Court's most conservative Justice. In all 
but one of the four terms (and in 1945), Stone was more conserva-
tive than any of the Justices who had initially been appointed by 
Roosevelt. But the differences between him and the most conserva-
T he well-known aLi gnments of that period are documented in Snyder, 36 Soc Forces at 235 
(cited in note 43), and C. H erman Pritchett, Tbe Roosevelt Court: A Suuo' in .Judicial Polirics mul 
Values 1937- 1947, 32, 34, 242 (J\ilacmillan, 1948) . 
. ., Sec, for example, Nmional Labor Relations Board v .Jones & Ltmgbli11 Steel Corp., 30 I US I 
(1937) (uph old ing N ational Labor Relations Act of 1935); United Stares v Butler, 297 US 1 
(1936) (declaring AgricuiLlJral Adjusunent Act of 1933 unconstillltional); Rltilrorul f?etirement 
Board v Alton l?itilroad Co., 295 US 330 (I 935) (declaring Rai lroad Reti rement Act of 1934 
unconsti L11ti onal). 
46 For example, in the major cases tha t arose from secession and Pres ident Lincoln's 
policies during the C ivil \Var, the Court's Republicans generally were more fa vorable tO the 
Union's position than were its D emocrats . 
47 O ne famous example is President U . S. G rant's <lppointment of two Supreme Com t 
Justices (Joseph Brad ley and W illiam Strong) who supported G ram's view that paper money 
was consti LlJtional. W ith the backing of Bradley and Strong, the Court in 187 1 voted 5- 4 to 
overmrn an 1870 case that ruled that the federal government was without authori ty w issue 
paper money. Knoxv Lee, 79 US 457 (1 87 1) (overmrning Hepbum v Gris<vold, 75 US 603 (1870)). 
314 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2016 
rive Roosevelt appointee in each of those terms, as measured by the 
Martin-Quinn scores, were srnalJ. -+R 
Unlike today's partisan divide, there was widespread agreement 
among the Justices on issues that had previously divided the Court. 
Stone and Roberts, for example, joined the Court's Democratic-
appointed Justices in Wickard v Filbum,·19 embracing an extraordi -
narily broad interpretation of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 
More telling, there was wide divergence among the Martin-Quinn 
scores of the seven Democratic-appointed Justices on the 1941- 44 
Court. 50 In particular, there were sharp conflicts over civil rights and 
civil liberties issues. 51 Furthermore, it was in the Stone Court, be-
ginning in 1941, that dissenting votes and dissenting and concurring 
opinions began to proliferate. 52 In several landmark rulings involving 
the First Amendment rights of.J ehovah's Witnesses, for example, the 
Court's Democratic-appointed Justices were bitterly divided. 53 Be-
yond disagreements over legal doctrine, emnity among the Roosevelt 
•• To the extent that the Court's ideological division in that period coincided wi th party 
lines, it should be noted that it is considerably more li kely mathematica lly tha t these lines will 
coincide when only two Justices are from the minori ty party, and even more likely when 
there is one Justice from that pany, thnn when the partisan division is 6- 3 or 5- 4. For ex-
ample, the odds of two specific Justices out of nine randomly standing to the right of all their 
colleagues is 1 in 36; the odds of four om of nine is 1 in 126 . 
. ,., 317 US I ll (1942). For an illuminating discussion o f internal Court deliberations (re-
vea ling that Democrats such as Robert Jackson were especially concerned about the reach o f 
the decision), see Barry C ushman, Fomwli.•·'" mul Realism in Counnene Clause Jm·ispmdeuce, 67 
U Chi L Rev 1089 (2000). . 
5
" T hc range of Martin-Quinn scores among the fum Democrats in the 20 10 Term was 
.678; in the 20 11 Term, it was .947. In contrast, the ranges among the seven Democra ts in 
the 1941 - 44 Terms were, successive ly, 3.489, 3.475, 3.349, and 3.095. Ranges of Martin-
Q uinn scores should be in terpreted with caution, because rl1e scores are not on a f1i lly linear 
scale (sec Ho and Quinn, 98 Cal L Rev at 846- 47), but die differences are nonerl1eless 
striking. 
51 Sec generally, Leuchtcnburg, Tbe Supn:me Coun Reborn (cited in note 31) (noting 
div isions within New Dea l Court on civil rights and li berties). 
5
' See' I'hmnas G. Walker, Lee Epstein, and W illiam J . Dixon, On tbe i\lly.m:rious Demi.1'e of 
Cimseu.wwl Nor111s in tbe United States Supn:me Court, 50 J Pol 362 (1988) . 
5
·' In i'vlurdocb v Peumylvania, 319 US 105 (1943), die Court struck down a city ordinance 
with licensing and tax requirements for door-ro-door sa les as applied to me activities of 
Jehovah's Witnesses. ld (overruling Jones v Opelika, 316 US 584 (1942)). T he dissenters 
included not only Republican appointee Owen Roberts but also Roosevelt appointees Felix 
Frankfurter, Stanley Reed, and Robert Jackson. In West Virginia Stttte Board ofEdumtion v 
Bmwerre, 319 US 624 (1943), the Court held rl1a t compulsory participation of public school 
smdents in flag sa lute ceremonies violn ted F irst Amendment Rights of Jehovah's vVitnesses. 
lei (overruling ivfin m ville St:b. Dist. v Gobitis, 310 US 586 ( 1940)). D emocratic appointees 
Robe rts, Frankfimcr, and Reed dissented . 
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appointees reached a level that has had few if any parallels in the 
Court's history.H 
The Warren Court illustrates the complicated relationship be-
tween party and ideology throughout this period. President Hany 
Tnunan's four appointees55 all developed relatively conservative re-
cords on the Court, while Eisenhower appointees Earl Warren and 
William Brennan were distinctly more liberal. Correspondingly, in 
the decisions that sharply divided the Court, both majority and mi-
nority coalitions typically had representatives from botl1 parties. In 
Miranda v A1'izona, so for instance, the majority consisted of two 
Republican- and three Democratic-appointed Justices, while tl1e 
dissenters included two Republican- and two Democratic-appointed 
Justices. 57 
The relationship between party and ideology remained compli-
cated in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Based on the Martin-
Quinn scores, Brennan was one of the two most liberal Justices in 
each of his last twenty terms on tl1e Court, from 1970 to 1990. 
President Gerald Ford's appointee John Paul Stevens was to the left 
of the Court's center throughout his tenure from 197 5 to 2010, and 
from 1991 to 2010 he was the most liberal]ustice. President George 
H . W. Bush's appointee David Souter was at the center of the Court 
in the 1991 Term, his first year as a Justice, and to tl1e left of center for 
the remainder of a tenure tl1at ended in 2009. For his part, John 
Kennedy's appointee Byron White was near tl1e Court's ideological 
center throughout his tenure on the Court from 1962 to 1993, and 
during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts he stood to the right of 
Brennan, Stevens, and (from the 1979 Term on) Harry Blackmun, a 
Richard Nixon appointee. 
As in the period from 1790 to 193 7, tl1e lack of a partisan divide in 
the Court from 1938 to 2010 is underlined by tl1e divisions of the 
,.. See Noah Feldman, Sc011Jions: Tbe Battles and 'TI-imnpbs of FDl? 's Great Supreme Court 
Justices (Grand Centn1l , 201 0); H. N . Hirsch, The Euigma of re fix Fmnkj1m er 127- 200 (Basic 
Books, 198 1). 
55 Those appointees were C hief Justice Fred Vinson (appointed in 1946), Harold Burton 
(1945), T om C lark (1949), and Sherman Minton (1949). 
5(, 384 us 436 (1966). 
57 Justices in the majority were Roosevelt appoin tees Hugo 131ack and W illiam 0. Douglas, 
Eisenhower appoin tees Earl VVarren and Wi ll iam Brennan, and Jolmson appointee Abe 
Fortas. The dissenters were Truman appointee T om Clark, Kennedy appointee Byron 
White, and Eisenhower appo intees J ohn Harlan and Potter Stewart. 
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Justices in important cases. 5H Of the 322 cases in that period that 
the Guide to the U.S. Supn:me Cozn-t lists as important and in which at 
least two Justices dissented, 59 only one case divided all the Court's 
Republican-appointed Justices from all of their Democratic-appointed 
colleagues (and that decision is itself ambiguous) .60 That is a remark-
able record. 
But even while the Court continued to be without a sharply partisan 
division, the conditions for such a division were developing through 
the appointment process. Byron White, appointed by President Ken-
nedy in 1962, was the last moderate-to-conservative Democratic ap-
pointee. David Souter, appointed by George H. vV. Bush in 1990, was 
the last moderate-to-liberal Republican appointee. We will discuss 
the changes in presidential appointment strategies in Part III. For 
now, we simply note that these changes created the preconditions for 
an ideological division on the Court that coincided with party. 
We have described the partisan division between substantial blocs 
of Democratic- and Republican-appointed Justices that has existed 
since the beginning of the Court's 2010 Term, a division that stands 
in sharp contrast with earlier periods in the Court's history. Another 
indication of the distinctiveness of the current era is the number of 
important decisions in which the Justices lined up along party lines. 
As noted earlier, between 1790 and early 2010 there were only two 
decisions that the Guide to the U.S. SupTeme CouTt designated as im-
portant and that had at least two dissenting votes in which the Justices 
divided along party lines, about one-half of one percent. 6 1 By con-
trast, among the cases decided by the Court in the 20 10- 14 Terms, 
seven decisions in which the Court divided 5- 4 or (in one case) 5-3 
along party lines are obvious candidates for inclusion in the Guide's 
'" We will ret11rn to the period from 1969 to 1990 in Pnrt fV LO examine more closely the 
differences between the Court of tha t period and the cmrent Court. 
5
'' Savage, Guide to tbe U.S. Suprmte Coun at 1294-- 1340 (cited in note 36). Savage's li st o f 
important cases te rminates in the mid-2009 Term. 
""That case was f ed. E.'leaiou Counnissiou v Nmiollal Couservmivc Politiml Action Counu. , 470 
US 480 (1985). Four Justices (two Democrats and two Republicans) wrote or joined dis-
senting opinions. Of those four, the Court's two Democrats (Byron White and T hurgood 
Marsha ll) dissented most fu ll y from the Comt's decision, and David G . S.wage treats the 
Court's vote as 7-2. Savage, Guide to tbc U.S. Supn:me Court at 1240 (cited in note 36). 
'" In that period, there were 397 important decisions on which there were at least two 
dissents. The Guide's list of important decisions includes only part of the Court's 2009 Term. 
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list of important decisions.62 During the Court's 2015 Term, the 
Justices split 4-4-most likely on partisan lines-in high-visibility 
cases on public sector unions and on President Obama's immigration 
directive. 63 
C. PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFORMITY 
Today's partisan divide manifests itself in other ways. Most strik-
ing, the groups of]ustices appointed by Republican presidents and by 
Democratic presidents have each become more ideologically ho-
mogeneous. Moreover, each of the distinct groups of Justices lacks 
centrists, with the partial exception of)ustice Kennedy. Instead, there 
is ideological conformity within each group, even as the groups have 
diverged over time. 
The high level of homogeneity among Democratic- and among 
Republican-appointed Justices can be measured by the standard de-
"' Those decisions are: Bunvell v Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S Ct 275 1 (20 14) (interpreting the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act LO protect closely held corporations from a mandate LO 
include certain contraceptives in employee health plans); McCutcbeon v FEC, 134 S Ct 1434 
(2014) (stTiking down a federal statutory provision that put limi t on an individua l's tow! 
conu·ibutions to election candidates and candidate commit-rees); Shelby Cuty v Holder, 133 S 
Ct 2612 (20 13) (striking down Title IV of the Voting Rights Act); Florwce v Bd of Cboseu 
H·eebolden, 132 S Ct 1510 (2 01 2) (a llowing routine sn-ip-searches of arrestees at jails); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v Com:epciou, 563 US 333 (201 1) (disa llowi11g state resu-ictions on contract 
provisions prohibiting class actions in arbiu·ation); Anzoua I~>ree Eme1111·ise Club's H·eedom Club 
PA C v Bmnett, 131 S Ct 2806 (20 11 ) (su-iking down a state system of public funding for 
candidates for state offices); and Cbnmber of Com7llerce v Wbitiug, 131 S Ct 1968 (20 11 ) 
(a llowing sanctions on employers for hiring of undocumented aliens). In preparing this in-
ventory of cases, we consulted with David Savage, author of the Guide. 
"
1 Those cases are Friedricbs v Cnlifomirt Tencbm Association, 136 S Ct 1083 (2016) (dividing 
4 - 4 on whether mandatory fees to public sector unions violate free speech rights), :md Uuired 
States v Texas, 136 S Ct 227 1 (20 16) (dividing 4- 4 on legality of 20 14 Obama immigration 
directive). For news stories speculating that these 4 - 4 splits were a Democraric-Repubhcan 
sp]j t, see Adam Liptak, VictoJ)' jo1· Uuion.r as Supreme Court, Swlia Gone, Ties -1 -4, NY T imes 
(l'vlarch 29, 20 16), ava ilable at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/us/politicslfriedrichs-v 
-ca lifornia -teachers-associa cion-union -fees-supreme-court-ruling.h on!? _r = 0; Robert Barnes, 
Supreme Court Won't Revive Obrnntl Phm to Sbield lllegallunnigrnntsjiwn Deportntiou, Wash Post 
(June 23 , 20 16), HV<lilable at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-wont 
-revive-obmna-plan-to-shield- illegal-immigrants- from -deport-a tion/2 0 16/06/2 3/ 6cea 5 f1 e-3 9 50 
-1 I e6-9ccd-d6005beac8b3_story.hunl. In other high-profile cases (involving a religious lib-
erty challenge to tl~e Af!ordable Care Act and AJ·ticle III standing limits on class action law-
sui ts), the justices may well have masked partisan divisions by issuing ambiguous, .inconclusive 
opinions. Sec Mark Joseph Stern, SCOTUS Misses m1 Oppommif:J' to Gut Class Ac1ious aud Cou-
.wnner Privrny Lmvs, Slate (May 16, 2016), available at hnv://www.slate.com/blogs/the_sla test 
/20 16/05/16/spokeo_v _robins_spares_class_actions_;md_consumer_privacy.honl; Garret1: Epps, 
Tbe U.S. Supreme Court's Nouswse Ruliug in Zubik, T he Atlantic (May 16, 2016), available at 
http ://www. thea tla n tic.com/pol i tics/a rchive/2 0 16/0 5/the-su p reme-cou rts-non-sensica 1- ru I 
ing-in-zubik/482967 / . 
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viations of the Justices' conservative votes within each group,64 based 
on the coding of votes in the Supreme Court Database. The lower the 
standard deviation, the greater the ideological conformity within 
each group. The results are shown in figure 1, divided into subperiods 
that track changes in the Court's composition. 
For the Court's Democratic-appointed Justices, the standard de-
viation was very high in the 1986- 93 period because the only Dem-
ocratic appointees in that period were the very liberal Thurgood 
Marshall and the moderate conservative Byron White.65 In the longer 
period from 1994 through 2008, the two Democratic-appointed 
Justices were the like-minded Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen 
Breyer, and the standard deviations were low. That remained true 
after Ginsburg and Breyer were joined by Sonia Sotomayor and Elena 
Kagan. 
T he change came later for the Court's Republican-appointed 
Justices. The standard deviation remained high as long as the rela-
tively liberal John Paul Stevens and David Souter remained on the 
Court. After Souter retired at the end of the 2008 Term, though, the 
standard deviation fell by almost half; when Stevens retired after 
the 2009 Term, it again fell by half.66 With a more homogeneous set 
of Republican-appointed Justices on the Court, the standard devia-
tion has remained low ever since. 
Similarly, as figure 2 shows, the Republican and Democratic ap-
pointees have separated from each other ideologically. The average 
difference between these two sets of Justices in the frequency with 
which they cast conservative votes has flucn1ated considerably over 
time, but there was a general movement upward in the early 1990s 
and again in 2009 and 2010, as the Court's Republican and Dem-
ocratic appointees became more ideologically disti nct from each 
other. As in other analyses that we present, the percentages of con-
servative and Liberal votes cast by a Justice or by a set of Justices can be 
'··• · f'h e swndard deviation measures how widely a range of scores deviates from the mean of 
those scores. For the formula, see, e.g., Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics 67 (McGraw-
Hill, 1960). The standard deviation is useful for om purposes because it indicates the extent 
to wh ich the Justices of one party vary in their ideological positions. 
''
5 There were no sumdard devi ations for the 1991- 93 Terms because there was only one 
D cmocrnt on the Court; Marshall retired before the 1991 Term and White before the 1993 
T erm. 
"'' When Stevens retired, it fell from 16.2 to 9.1 percent; when Souter retired, it fell to 
4 percent. 
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Figure I. Mean standard deviations of percentages of conservative votes among Justices ap-
pointed by presidents from each party. The standard deviations shown for each paiod are the means 
of the smndard deviations for individual Courr terms during that period. T he proportions of con-
servative votes are calculated from data in the Supreme Courr Database, with votes that are not de-
fin ed as either liberal or conservative excluded. 
compared over time only with considerable caution, because those 
percentages are affected by the composition of the cases that the 
Court decides at any given time. For this reason, the data in figure 2 
do not necessarily mean that Democratic-appointed Justices became 
slightly more conservative and Republican-appointed Justices be-
came substantially more conservative across the periods shown.67 
Does the growing ideological distance between these two groups 
of Justices mean tl1at moderate Justices have disappeared from the 
Court? That question cannot be answered definitively, because tl1ere 
is no clea r benchmark for moderation.68 But it appears that Republican-
"' Thus when the Court's membership is tmchanged, term-by-term flucmations in per-
centages of liberal and conservative decisions are likely to result primarily fTom changes in 
the composition of the Court's agenda. Fluctuations i11 the agenda have an even greater 
impact on the ideological direction of the small numbers of decisions in a given te rm that 
receive the greatest attention. 
""For a recent academic u·eaunent of this subject (measuring modera tion by the number of 
swing ] ustices there are on the Court), see Brandon Bartels, Tbe Som·ces and Comequeuces of 
Polarization in tbe U.S. Supreme Cow·t, in J ames T hurber and Antoine Yoshinaka, eels, !lmcr-
imn Gridlock 171-200 (Cambridge, 201 5). 
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Figure 2. Mean percentage of conse rvative votes among Justices appointed by presidents from 
each party. As in figure I , the proportions of conservative votes are ca lculated from data in the Su-
preme Court Database, with votes that are not defined as either liberal or conservative excluded. 
T he percentages shown are the means of the mean percentages of conservative votes among a party 
group (for instance, :dl Democra tic appointees). T he periods coincide with the retirement of the 
last Democratic modera te (Bymn \Vhite) in I 993 and last Republican moderate Oohn Paul Stevens) 
in 20 10. 
appointed Justices are more strongly conservative than the Court's 
Democratic-appointed Justices are liberal.w There are no strong 
liberals on today's Court; more telling, analyses by Lee Epstein, 
William Landes, and Richard Posner rank four Roberts Court 
Republican-appointed Justices as among the most conservative Jus-
tices ever to sit on the Court.7° Finally, the evidence indicates that 
"''See Strauss, 21 Democracy at l l 4 (c ited in note 15) (arguing that there are no strong 
liberals on today's Court); Lee Epslc in, Wi lliam M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Tbe 
Bcbavio1· of Fed em/ Judgn: A Tb coretimt and E111piriml Swc!y of Rmioual Cboice I 08- 09 (Har-
vard, 201 3) (contending that today's Rcpublic m appointees are among the most conservative 
JusLi ces ever to sit on Court) . 
111 See id at table 3.2 (ranking- based on percentage of conservative voles casr- Roberrs, 
Thomas, A li to, Scalia as among ten most conservative since l 937); Lee Epste in, \N illiam M. 
Lan des, and Ri chard A. Posner, Revisiting tbe Ideology Ranki11g of Supnmze Court Justices, 44 ] 
Legal Stud S295, 313- 14 (Thomas, Sca li a, AJi ro among most conservative with respect to 
votes cast in cases covered hy Ne<v York 'f'i111 e.,· and Roberrs among mos t conservative in cases 
decided 5- 4). See also notes 142- 52 and accompanyin g text (discussing D emocra tic ap-
pointments stra tegies) . 
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the separation between Democratic- and Republican-appointed 
Justices is unique in the Court's history. In the parts that follow, we 
probe the reasons for this fundamental change in the Court. 
II. PARTISAN PoLARIZATION IN AMERICAN PoLITICS 
Starting in the 1980s, there has been a substantial increase in 
partisan polarization in government and among political elites out-
side government.7 1 As noted earlier, we focus on two overlapping 
forms of polarization. Through partisan sorting, ideological views 
and partisan identifications are more closely related than they were 
in the mid-twentieth century.72 Through affective polarization, Dem-
ocrats and Republicans increasingly see themselves as members of 
opposing teams and increasingly hold negative attitudes toward mem-
bers of the other party.73 
It is inevitable that the growth in political polarization in both of 
these senses would affect the Supreme Court, both directly and in-
directly. In the first section of this part, we highlight the growth of 
polarization in government. In the second section we exam_ine po-
larization in the larger elite world, including media outlets, tl1e lega l 
profession, and the academy. 
A. GOVERNMENT 
The growing ideological separation between the two parties is 
reflected in tl1e federa l government. Democratic and Republican 
71 For general treatment of the rise of polarization in Congress, among elites, and among 
media outlets, see Nolan M. McCarty, Keith T . Poole, and Howard Roscntl1al, Polariud 
Amerim: Tbe Dance ofldeolo&'Y and Unequal Ricbes (MIT, 2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.wm 
2.0 (Princeton, 2009); Earl Black and Merle Black, Divided Amerim: 'OJe Ferocious P01uer 
Sn·uggle in Ameriam Politics (S imon & Schuster, 2008); Sean M . T heriau lt, Pany Polarizmion 
in Congnss (Cambridge, 2008); Mark A. Graber, Tbe Corniug Constiwtional Yo-Yo? Z.:lite 
Opinion, Polarization, and tbe Dhwtion o(Jmlicial Decil"ion i\l!a/.:ing, 56 Howard L J 66 1, 681 -
703 (2013); Geoffrey C. Layman et al, Party Polarization in Amerimn Politin·, 8 Ann Rev Pol 
Sci 83 (2006). 
In contrast with people in government and other political elites, tl1 e extent to which 
polarization has gTown in the mass public is uncertain and a m;mer of debate. H owever, 
there is evidence of an increased level of affective polarization in the public as a whole. 
See Shamo Iyenga r and Sean J. \ ;vestwood, Fear mul Loatbing Across Part:}' Lines: Nt~u 
Evideuce on Group Po/arizatiou, 59 Am J Pol Sci 690 (20 15); M iller and Conover, 68 Pol 
Res Q at 225 (cited in note 8). 
" See notes 74- 82 and accompanying text. 
73 See notes I 07- 09 and accompanying text. 
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officials have grown more distinct from each other ideologically and 
more hostile to each other. 
Because congressional behavior can be analyzed through voting 
patterns, the separation between the parties is especially clea r in 
Congress?+ Today, Republicans and Democrats in Congress are 
ideologically distinct, as measured by their votes. No Democrat in 
either the House or the Senate is more conservative than the most 
liberal Republican in the same chamber.75 By 2009, the ideological 
distance between the Democratic and Republican parties was greater 
than it had been at any time since Reconstruction. 76 This trend is 
largely attributable to the rightward movement of the Republican 
Party.77 By 2012, the growth of the Tea Party had pushed the divide 
even further (as relatively moderate senators such as Texas's Kay 
Bailey Hutchinson were replaced by strong conservatives like Ted 
Cruz).7H In contrast, while the Democratic Party has become more 
.liberal over time, the change has been less dramatic.n The dearth of 
members who can be characterized as moderates is one of the most 
striking features of today's Congress.Ho In 1980, moderates made up 
approximately 40 percent of Congress; today, moderates are nearly 
extinct, making up less than 5 percent of Congress.H' 
"' On ramifications of pa rtisanship in Congress, see Neal Devins, Prmy Polrwizmion and 
Congressional Committee Comidemtion of Constitutional Questions, 105 Nw U L Rev 737, 753-
59, 776-81 (20 11 ). For related discussion of polarization's impact on state politics, see Neal 
Devins and Sa ikrishna Prakash, SO States, SO Attomeys Geneml, SO Approaches to tbe Dmy to 
Defend, 124 y,,}e LJ 2100,2 150- 54 (20 15). 
75 Data on the ideological ordering of senators and House members are presented at DW-
NOMJN!IT E Scores lit to 1/ Jtb Cougresses, Votevicw.com, voteview.com/dwnl.han. 
"·See Party Polm·izmion: 1879- 2014, at hnv://voteview.com/poli tical_polarization_20 14 
.hun. The widened ideological gap between Republicans and Democrats in Congress re flecL~ 
multiple fo rces, including growing differences in the personal ideological positions of con-
gress ional Republ icans and Democrats, increasingly extreme views of party activists who 
influence members' positions, and members' and leaders' interest in enhancing their pany's 
power in government and in the country. For a discussion of how party efforts to amass 
power exacerbate polarization and produce more party-l ine voti ng, see T heriault, Party Po-
lmizmiolt in Congre.D· 177- 80 (cited in note 71). 
77 See Man: Grossman and David A. H opkins, AJ)•tmlletTic Politics 253 (Oxford, 20 16). 
'" Sec "Common Space" DW-NONflN!l'f'E Scores ·witb Boommpped Standard Erron (Joim 
House rmd Senate Smling) , at httv:l/voteview.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htl11. 
7
'' G rossman and Hopkins, !1.1)'1/lllletTic Politic!' at 253 (c ited in note 77). 
' " Sec Richard L. H asen, Eud of the Dialogue? Politiatl Polarization, tbe Supreme Cotwt, and 
Congre.1s, 86 USC L Rev 205, 235- 37 (2013) . 
"' Sec Tbe Polarization of tbc Congressional Parties, at http://voteview.com/pol itica l_polar 
il.ation_20 14. htm. 
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The ideological distance between the parties today presents a 
striking contrast to the Congresses of the Warren and Burger Court 
eras (1953-86). The rapid rise in partisan sorting began in the 1980s; 
starting in the 1990s, a surge of southern Republicans substantially 
propelled the polarization of the parties.H2 
These developments are illustrated in figure 3. The figure, de-
veloped by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, employs a measure 
of the ideological positions of members of Congress to show the 
ideological distance between the two parties in the House and Sen-
ate over time.83 The figure highlights the sharp increase in polari-
zation that has occurred in recent decades. In contrast with the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress from the 1920s 
to the 1970s featured relatively limited polarization between the 
parties. But that period was followed by a sharp increase, resulting in 
a Congress that is even more polarized now than the Congress of a 
century ago. 
One area in which polarization in Congress and the executive branch 
has had a particularly powerful effect is in the process of nominating 
and confirming federal judges. As we will discuss in Part III, in recent 
decades presidents-especially Republican presidents- have increas-
ingly chosen nominees who represent their party's ideological orien-
tation. In the Senate, there has been a dramatic increase in the amount 
of time it takes to confirm lower-court judges and an equally dramatic 
decrease in the percentage of lower-court nominees whom the Judi-
ciary Comnuttee now approves.84 Over the past two decades, and 
especially over the past ten years, the number of failed nominations 
has sharply increased and failed nominations for the courts of appea ls 
typically lingered in the Senate for over a year.H5 It was this trend that 
spurred Senate Democrats in 2013 to invoke the so-called "nuclear 
option"-allowing for a simple up-or-down majority vote on presi-
"' See Earl. Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Sontbern Republicans (Harva rd, 2003). 
"' C hart available at h ttp:l/voteview.com/political_polarization_2014.htm. 
•• See Sarah A. Binder and Forrest Maltzman, Tbe Politic.< of Advice and Consent: Pmtiug 
Judges 011 rbe Fedeml Beucb, in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce L Oppenheimer, eels, Congre.1:r 
Recomidered 265 (lOth ed 20 12); Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. O leszek, Congress and Its 
Membm 3 79- 87 (CQ Press, 11th ed 2008). 
"' See Binder and Maltzman, Cougress Recousidered at 266- 71 (cited in note 84). 
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Figure 3. Party polarization, 1879- 20 14. Dista nce between the parties on the first (libera l-
conservative) dimension. Source: Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosemhal, voteview blog. 
dential nominations to lower courts, independent agencies, and ex-
ecutive branch positions.86 
Senate voting on judicial nominees, especially Supreme Court nom-
inees, has also become increasingly partisan .H7 Except for Clarence 
T homas, the Justices on the Court today who were nominated prior 
to 2005 were all confirmed by unanimous or overwhelmingly positive 
votes.HH Sta rting with John Roberts, however, nom.inees have received 
large numbers of negative votes from senators of the opposing party.89 
"'·See H umberto Sanchez, A Lmulmm·k Cba11ge to tbe Filibuster, CQ vVeekly Rpt, 1992 (Dec 2, 
2013). I' or tables detn iling a dramatic rise in fi libusters tied to judicial and other executive branch 
nominations, see US Senate, Senate Action on Clomre Motions, archived at https://perma.cc 
/NR5X-4HW4; Sahi Kapur, Charts: Wby tbe Fililnm:er May Soon Be Dead, Talki ng Poin ts 
J\!Tc mo (Nov 25, 2013, 6:00a.m.), archived at hnvs:l/pcn na.cc/INBR3-QM9K. 
"' See A. E. Dick 1-[oward, Tbe Changing Face oftbe Supreme Comt, I 01 VaL Rev 23 1, 292-
315 (20 15) . 
"" Thomas was confirmed by a 52-48 vole. Stephen l.lreycr received n ine negative votes, 
Ruth Bader G insburg dlJ'ee; Antonia Scalia :mel Andw ny Kennedy were confirmed unani -
mously. See U. S. Senate, Supreme Court Nominations, Present- 1789, archived at https:// 
penna.cc/EV9N-GPZG. 
"'Consider, fo r example, then-Senato r Barack Obama's slatement (in explaining his no 
vote on ChiefJusti ce Roberts) that he has "absol utely no doub t" d1a t Robe rts was qualified to 
sit on d1e Court but that he gave weight to the impact of a Justice's "deepest values" and "the 
depth and bread d1 " of a .Justice's "empathy." See Nomination of .John Roberts, 151 Cong Rec 
21 032 (cited in note 2 1). 
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Roberts, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor all had the unanimous 
support of the president's party in Congress, and only one Democrat 
voted against Elena Kagan. Democrats split evenly in the Roberts 
confirmation vote; Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch were op-
posed by a majority of members of the opposition party?) It is difficult 
to imagine that a nominee like Ruth Bader Ginsburg could be con-
firmed today with only three negative votes, or that a nominee like 
Antonin Scalia could win unanimous approval; indeed, the extraor-
dinary decision of Senate Republicans to block any consideration of 
President Obama's nomination of Merrick Garland to succeed Justice 
Scalia underscores how divisive and partisan Supreme Court confir-
mation battles have become.9 1 
B. THE LARGER ELITE WORLD 
Party polarization in government tracks a growing ideological di-
vide among affluent, well-educated Democrats and Republicans. Dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, when both Republicans and Democrats 
occupied every ideological niche, Democratic and Republican elites 
tended to agree on some major issues, especially with respect to civil 
rights and civilliberties.92 Today, however, Democratic and Repub-
lican elites are at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum in their 
policy positions. Indeed, Democratic elites are more liberal than other 
Democrats, and Republican elites are more conservative than other 
RepublicansY3 
The consequences of such elite polarization are profound. Al-
though the potential impact of the views of the general public on the 
''" H asen, 86 USC L Rev at 246- 48 (cited in note 80). For this very reason, there is now 
widespread specula tion tha t the Senate (if controlled by the opposition party) would not allow 
a vo te on future Supreme Court nominations. See Linda H irschman, fVby the Next Supreme 
Court VtWI1h)' Will F'avm· Libemlr No !lifatter 1-Vho Retinr, \ iVash Post (Dec 31, 2015), archived 
at https:/ / perma.cc/G9DJ-L3AVV. 
'" See Shear and Steinhauer, M01 ·e Republicm1s (cited in note 3). See also Brent Marcin, Chief 
]11Jt ice Robert.\': Swlia, Ginl'blllg Wouldn 't be Confirmed Today, Nebrasb Radio Network (Sept 19, 
201 4), archived at https:/ /pcnna.cc/ RQ6Z-MRT 4 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts 2014 com-
ment that neither G insburg nor Scalia "would have a chance" of confirmation tocb y). 
"'See H erbert M.cCiosky, Cousmws and Ideology in Ameriwn Politics, 58 Am Pol Sci Rev 361 
(1.964); Peter Skerry, Tbe Class Conflict over Abortion, 52 Pub Interest 69 (1978). 
''
3 See G raber, 56 Howard L J at 693-712 (cited in note 71) (discussing polling data); 
Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M . Carsey, Party Polmizfl tiou and "Conflict Extensiou" in the 
Awerimu Eleaomte, 46 Am J Pol Sci 786, 789 (2002) (noting elite polariza tion wi th respect to 
"social welfare, racia l, and cull11Tal issues"). 
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Supreme Court receives a great deal of attention,9-1 elite values exert 
an even more powerful impact. Because the Justices are part of the 
elite sector of society, their own views tend to refl ect elite attitudesY5 
During the 1960s, for example, W arren Court liberalism was fueled 
by elite support in both parties; today, the Roberts Court's sharp 
ideological divide is fueled by the partisan divide between elite Dem-
ocrats and Republicans.96 
During the Warren and Burger Court eras, Supreme Court de-
cisions on race, religion, and other socially divisive issues tended 
to track e)jte views . ~7 T he Court's school prayer decisions of 1962 
and 1963 , for example, were widely unpopular with the mass public 
(85 percent disapproved in a 1964 survey), but elite support "for the 
Supreme Court's secularization project was clearly visible in the ac-
tivities of law professors and deans [and] in the pronunent newspaper 
editorials endorsing" the Court's decisions.n On issues involving free 
speech and equal protection, several studies pointed to a gap between 
elite and popular opinion. As one study concluded, "[s]ociallearning, 
insofar as it affects support for civil liberties, is likely to be greater 
among the influentials (that, is political elites) of the society than among 
the mass public."')<) Likewise, attitudes toward abortion in 1965- 80 re-
vealed a striking gap between elites and the mass public; indeed, "the 
best predictor of abortion attitudes" was level of education. 100 
Unlike elites during the Warren and Burger Court eras, today's 
eli tes, li ke Congress itself, are sharply divided along partisan lines. 
·n See, for example, Bany Friedman, :tbe /!Viii oftbe People: Hmv Public Opinion l-Ias Iufluenml tbe 
Supn me Courtmul Sbaped the Metmingof tbe Con.rritlltion (Macmillan, 2009); and Richard L. Pi ides, 
l.r tb ~ Supn me Court a "Majo1irtn-iau" bwitmiou(, 2010 Supreme Court Review 103. 
'
15 13aum and D evins, 98 G eorgetown L J at 153 7- 46 (cited in note 12). 
''" \Ne are not the first to make this point. See Graber, 56 Howard LJ at 665 (cited in note 7 L). 
·n lh um and Devins, 98 Georgetown L J at 1570- 74 (cited in note 12) (documenting that 
Supreme Court is more likely to adhere to views of individuals with postgraduate degrees 
than individuals with lower levels of education). 
''" John C. Jeffri es, Jr. and Jmncs E. Ryan, A Political Histmy of rbe Esrablislnueut Clause, I 00 
Mich L Rev 279, 325 (2 00 1). For 1964 survey data, see U niv of Mich Survey Research Ctr, 
;lmeriwn Natioual Election Studies: 19M Pre-Po,-t Election Stru(y 13 (Sept-Nov 1964), archived 
at https://perma.cc/ l'DV8-QBNR. T he decisions were Engel v Vitale, 3 70 US 421 (1962); and 
Abington School District v Sdm npp, 3 74 US 203 ( 1963). 
'' '' H erbert McClosky and Alida Bri ll , Dimemiom of Tolerance: Wbm Ameriwus Believe About 
Civil Uberties 23 3 (Russell Sage, 1983) . See also McC losky, 58 Am Pol Sci Rev at 3 73 (cited in 
note 92) (noLing that "political inAuentials" give "stronger approval" to "democratic ideas" 
than "ordinary voters") . For addi tional smdies, see sources cited in G raber, 56 Howard LJ at 
686- 87 (cited in note 71). 
"" Donald Gra nberg and Beth \Velhm n G ranberg, Abortion Attiwde.,·, 1965- 1980: Trw ds 
ami Detm niurmn, 12 Family Planning Persp 250, 254 (1980). 
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Polling data make it clear that the opinions of Republicans and Dem-
ocrats with high socioeconomic status and high levels of education 
diverge more than the opinions of the population as a whole. In turn, 
the political class is dominated by polarized elites and, as such, the 
"extremes are overrepresented in the political arena and the center 
underrepresented."' 0 ' 
This state of affairs is evident in 2005, 2011, and 2014 surveys by 
the Pew Research Group. 102 By correlating income and education 
to political beliefs, the Pew studies make clear that the most liberal 
Americans are affluent, well-educated Democrats and the most con-
servative Americans are affluent, well-educated Republicans.10 3 These 
studies also highlight growing polarization among elites. Most sig-
nificant (and tracking the hardening of the right on today's Supreme 
Court), 104 these studies identify dramatic changes among strong po-
litical conservatives since the 1980s. In the 1980s, conservatives di-
vided between two groups: economic and social conservatives. By 2005, 
economic conservatives had adopted the cultural beliefs of social 
conservatives. 105 Liberal Democrats became even more liberal during 
this period. On same-sex marriage, abortion rights, and restrictions 
on civil liberties tied to the War on Terror, "[m]embers of the most 
affluent well educated group of Democrats tended to be far more 
liberal on all issues than members of other Democratic groups." 106 
At the same time, political competition has become more per-
sonalized and more bitter. Republicans and Democrats increasingly 
view each other negatively, see themselves in competition, and are 
"angry" when the other side wins a close election. 107 Moreover, voters 
now seek out information to back up preexisting policy preferences 
Jtll Morris P. Fiorina et ;l l, Culwre 111m'? The Nlytb of a Polarized Ameriw 200 (Longman , 
3d eel 2011). 
102 Tbe 2005 Politiml Typology, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (May 10, 
2005), archived at lmps://penna.cc/SN5Z-8XU9; B~youd Red vs. lJlue: Political Typology, Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press (May 4, 20 11), at lmp://www.people-press.org 
/files/legacy-pdf/13eyond-Recl-vs-Biue-The-Politicai-Typology.pclf; Beyond Red vs. Blue: Tbc 
Politiml 'I)'pology, Pew Research Center (June 26, 2014). T he 2005 and 2011 polls <lre discussed 
in G raber, 56 How:1rd L J at 695- 700 (cited in note 71). 
10J Pew, 2005 Political Topolo&'l' at 64- 65 (cited in note 102); Pew, Beyond Red v. lJlue (2011) 
at 105, 109, 111 (cited in note 102); Pew, Beyoud Red v. Blue (2014) at 92, 99- 102 , 111- 12 
(cited in note 102). 
I IH See Part IV. 
"" Pew, 2005 Politiml Topology at 53 (cited in note 102). 
10
" Graber, 56 Howard L J at 698 (cited in note 71). 
107 See Mi ller and Conover, 68 Pol Res Qat 232 (cited in note 8). 
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rather than to educate themselves. 108 The level of animosity along ideo-
logical lines is suggested by a 2 014 survey that fmmd that 2 3 percent 
of people with consistently liberal views would be unhappy if an im-
mediate fami ly member were to marry a Republican, and 30 percent 
of tl1eir conservative counterparts would be tmhappy about a marriage 
to a Democrat. 109 
The growth in ideological and partisan polarization is reflected 
in today's news media. During the Warren and Burger Court eras, 
moderate-to-liberal network television and da ily newspapers domi-
nated public discourse. 11 0 As a response to a perceived liberal bias 
in the media, conservatives established tl1eir own informational infra-
structure, which culminated with the establishment of the Fox News 
channel. 111 Liberal ideologues attempted to replicate tl1is trend, though 
they were not as successful. 112 Over the past thirty years, the prolif-
eration of cable television, the Intemet, and the blogosphere has trans-
fonned the public discourse by producing major media outlets that are 
distinctly on the political left or right. 1 13 Surveys show that among 
people who are politically involved, liberals and conservatives have 
strong tendencies to select news sources whose political orientation is 
similar to their own. 114 
"m See Tl ya Somin, Kumvledge Abo/It Ignomnce: Ne1v Directions in the Study of Politicrellu-
jorlllation, 18 Critica l Rev 255, 260-62 (2006); Neal Devins, The D'Oh! of Popular Coustitlt-
tioualism, 105 MichL Hcv 1333, 1340- 46 (2007). 
'"' Politiwl Polrtrizntion in tbe American Public 48, Pew Research Center (June 12 , 2014). 
110 See William Powers, Tbe ivlassless M.edia , Atlantic (]an/Feb 2005) at 124 ("[T]he po-
li tica l cul tlll'e of tl1e 1940s and 1950s discouraged extremism ... . Po li tics hewed to tl1e center, 
and the media both reOected and reinforced tl1is tendency ... . Th[e] establishment consensus 
exploded in tl1e 1960s and 1970s, ... but the mass media hung on for a few decades, a vestigial 
reminder of what had been."). For additional discussion, see notes 92 - 100 and accompanying 
text (examining how eli te social networks favored libera l outcomes during 1969- 90 era). 
111 Grossman and Hopkins, A.1)'711111et1'it Politics at 147 (cited in note 77). 
11 1 Jd at 152- 53. 
11 3 See Richard A. Posner, Bad Ne-ws, NY Times (July 31, G9 2005) ("The current ten-
dency to poli tical polarizmjon in news reporting is tlms a consequence of changes not in 
underlying poli tica l opinions, but in costs, specifically tllC t;1lling cost of new entrants."). 
Polarization was also fueled by changes in federal regulatory po licy, most notably the repeal 
of the Fa irness Doctrine in 1987, and the related prolifera tion of conservative and li beral 
media outlets tl1at allowed consumers to get tl1eir news ;mel opinion progranuning from 
stations that reinforced preexisting ideological commiunents . See Cass R. Sunstein, Delib-
emtive Trouble? Wby GToups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L J 71, 101 (2000) (a rguing tl1a t changes 
in d1 e news media resulting from the repeal of Fairness "may create group polarization" as 
"a ll too m;my people might be exposed to louder echoes of tl1eir own voices"). 
JJ.J Markus Prior, Media/am! Politiml Polarization, 16 Ann Rev Pol Sci 101 (20 13); Amy 
Mitchell ct al, Politiml Polarizmion tmd Media Nab irs, Pew Research Center (Oct 21, 20 14), at 
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Analogous changes have occurred in the legal profession. In the 
1960s and 1970s the elite segment of the legal profession, including 
bar groups like the American Bar Association, leaned to the left. 115 
In response, conservatives in the profession sought to redress what 
they saw as an ideological imbalance. 116 One result was the estab-
lishment of public interest law firms representing conservative po-
sitions.117 Another was the creation and growth of the Federalist 
Society, which originated as a reaction to the perceived liberal bias 
of elite law schools. 11 H The Federalist Society serves as a reference 
group for conservative law students and lawyers, each with its own 
organizations and activities under the society's umbrella; 11 9 the Amer-
ican Constih1tion Society, created in response to the success of the 
Federalist Society, serves a similar though less critical function for 
liberals.120 
These developments are reflected in the emergence of distinct 
career paths for conservatives and liberals in the elite segment of 
lutp://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/politica l-polarization-media-habirs/. Due to this o·end, 
conservative Republicans have become increasingly ideologically distinct fi·mn Democrats. See 
G rossma n and Hopkins, Asxnnnetric Politics at 157 (cited in note 77). 
" ' See Teles, Conm-vative Legal Movement at 41- 59 (cited in note 13) (tracking rise of 
libera l legal establishment). C hanges in the views of the elite segmem of the legal profession 
were reflected in the shjft of the American Bar Association from its traditional conservatism 
to a more liberal stance beginn ing in the 1960s. Id at 28-3 5. There was a similar leaning to 
the left in the news media tl1at covered U1e Supreme Court. T he most prominent Supren1e 
Court reporters, such as AntJ10ny Lewis and Linda Greenhouse of me New York Times and 
N ina Totenberg of National Public Radio, reported and assessed tl1 e Justices ' positions 
primarily from a liberal perspective. Conservative complaints about the impact of a liberal 
elite sometimes singled out Greenhouse, and Thomas Sowell and Laurence Si lberman 
popularized the term "Greenhouse effect" to refer to thjs impact. See T homas Sowell, 
13/admnm Play.r to tbe Cm1vd, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 7B (May 4, 1994); Arracking Aaivism, 
]ut!ge Na111es Names, Legal Times 14- 17 (June 22, 1992) ( hereafter Attacking A,tivi.wn) (reponing 
on speech by federal court of appea ls Judge Lau.rence Silberman). 
'"'See generally, Ann SoutJ1worth, LmiJycrs of tbe Rigbt: Profc.,:.·ioualizing tbe Conservative 
Coalir.ion (Chicago, 2008); Teles, Conse1-vative Legal Movement at 58-59, 135- 80 (cited in note !3). 
For a discussion of tl1e efforts of the Reagan adminism1tion to o·;msform the legal profession 
by credentialing young conservative lawyers, see notes 170-76 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Reagan admiiusu·ation efforts to groom conservatives who would later become federal 
court judges and Supreme Court Justices). 
117 See SoutJ1wonh, Lmvye1:r of tbe Rigbt at 8-40 (cited in note 1 16). 
''" Michael Avery and Danielle McLaughlin, Tbe Fech:mlist Society: f-lo1v Consei'Viltives Took 
tbe Lmv Back jiwn Libemlr (Vanderbilt, 20 !3); Hollis-Brusky, Ideas 1vitb Comequwces (cited in 
note !3). 
"'' Hollis-13rusky, Ideas 1vitb Consequ1!11ces at 13- 15 (cited in note 13); descriptions of the 
sectors of tl1e society for students and for pr;Jcticing lawyers are at its website, http:! /www 
.fed-soc.org/. 
'"'Sec Hollis- Brusky, ldetu witb Consequences at 166- 67 (cited in note 13). 
330 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2016 
the legal profession. Outstanding students at the most prestigious 
law schools increasingly move into clerkships with federa l appellate 
judges who share their ideological orientations, and then into pres-
idential administrations, law firms, and other institutions that also 
share their liberal or conservative views. 121 
Of course, Supreme Court justices are part of the social and legal 
elite. They are "overwhelmingly upper-middle or upper-class and 
extremely well educated, usually at the nation 's more elite universi-
ties."1 22 T he current justices of the Supreme Court, as Judge Richard 
Posner has observed, are "sheltered, cosseted," and most of them 
"grew up in privileged circumstances and do not rub shoulders with 
hoi polloi."12·1 All the justices who sat on the Court from 2010 through 
2016 attended Harvard or Yale law schools, nearly all came from well-
to-do families, and those who did not (Thomas, Sotomayor) received 
million dollar plus advances for writing their autobiographies. 124 In 
Part IV, we explain the importance of elite social networks to Su-
preme Court decision making and to the growth in partisan polari-
zation on the Court. 
III. ExPLAINING THE GROWTH IN PoLARIZATION: 
TnE APPOINTMENT PRocEss 
As we have suggested, the simultaneous growth of polariza-
tion on the Supreme Court and among elites in politics, the media, 
and the legal profession is not a coincidence; changes in the Court 
'" See WilLiam E. Nelson et al, The Libeml Tmdition oftbe Supreme Com·t Clerkship: In l?ise, 
Fall, ami Reincamation?, 62 Vand L Rev 1749, t 775- 91 (2009) (d iscussing both postclerk 
employment and the increasing polarization among Justi ces in selecting clerks who had 
previously worked for appeals court judges of the same politica l pany) . For additiona l dis-
cussion, sec notes 258- 61 and accompanying text. 
"' Michael J. Klarman, Whnt 'sSo GreatAbomCoMitmionalism, 93 Nw UL Rev 145, 189 (1998). 
'" Richard A. Posner, 1-fo<v Judge;· Think 306 (Ha rva rd, 2008). 
114 ld; Howard, I 01 Va L Rev at 25 1- 52 (cited in note 87); Adam Liptak, Sotomayo1· Got 
$1.175 Million for Me11loi1·, Foml.l" Reveal, N Y Times (May 27 , 20 1 t ), archived at Imps:// 
perma.cc/5EAE-SYWJ; Brent Kendall , Sotomayor Got $1.175 Million Book Advance, Wall St J 
(May 27, 20 1 l 3:28 p.m.), archived at htt.ps://penna.cc/QFSZ-R2DH. When campaigning 
for president, Donald Tnunp issued a list of t.wcnt.y-one potential Supreme Court nominees 
that seemed "a revo lt against the elites." Adam Liptak, 'Ti-mnp's Supreme Court List: Ivy 
Lmgue? Out. T!Je Hwrrlaml? In, NY T imes (Nov 14, 20 16), ava ilable at http://www.nytimes 
.com/20 16/ 11115/us/polit.i cs/trump-suprcme-court-Justices.html? _r = 0. T rnmp's list la rgely 
eschewed eli tes from the cast or west coast as we ll as candidates who attended Harvard or 
Ya le law schools. lei. 
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reflect changes in its political environment. In this part and in Part IV 
we probe the linkages between the two. In this part, we examine 
changes in the process of presidential appointment of Justices. In 
Part IV we examine changes in the social environments of the Justices. 
The role of ideology in the appointment of Justices has grown in 
both Democratic and Republican administrations over the past few 
decades. But this growth has taken different forms in the two parties, 
and it has been more substantial on the Republican side due to the 
fact that Republicans have become more ideologically homogenous 
than Democrats. 125 
A. DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS 
In nominating Supreme Court Justices, presidents consider much 
more than the "objective" qualifications of potential nominees, such 
as their legal abilities and their ethical behavior. Presidents also 
consider ideology, use of nominations as a reward for service to the 
president and the president's party, political benefits that may be 
gained through a nomination, and the nominee's prospects for con-
firmation. 126 
The relative weights given to policy and other considerations have 
varied considerably from president to president and even ti·om nom-
ination to nomination. 117 Over the Court's histmy, some presidents 
have given close attention to the policy preferences of at least some 
of their nominees, 128 but they were distinctly in tl1e minority. Our 
historical analysis focuses on the period since the 1930s, which might 
be regarded as tl1e beginning of the "modern" era of the Court.129 
1. From Roosevelt to Jobnson. Franklin Roosevelt (193 3-45) gave a 
high priority to policy considerations in his Supreme Court appoint-
w Grossman and Hopkins, Asymmetric Polith"J· (cited in note 77). 
116 Lawrence B:mm, Tbe Supreme Court 35-40 (CQ Press, 12th eel 2015). 
117 See genera lly, Henry J. Abraham, .Justices, hcsidems, and Seuaton: A Histol)' of U.S. 
Supreme Court Appointmems ji-om fVasbin;,rton to llusb II (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). 
11
" Presidents who seem to fit tl1at description include Jefferson (see id at 70), Theodore 
Roosevelt (id at 124), and Ta ft (id at 131). T he two appoinonents by Ulysses S. Grant LO 
achieve reversa l of· the Court's first Leg·al Tender decision are anotl1er example of policy-
oriented choices. Robert G. McCloskey and Sanford Levinson, Tbe Amerium Supreme Court 
76 (Chicago, 2005). The decisions were Hepburn v Gris·wold, 8 HTaJI 603 (1870), and Kuox v 
Lee, 12 Wa ll 457 (1871). 
11
" j\llcCioskey and Levinson, Tbe Americml Supreme Court at 12 l- 47 (cited in note 128). 
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ments. Specifically, he responded to Court rulings invalidating New 
Deal initiatives 130 by nominating Justices who seemed likely to sup-
port broad interpretations of federal power over the economy. 13 ' The 
Roosevelt appointees diverged considerably on civil liberties issues, 
however. This may be partially due to the fact that Roosevelt's Dem-
ocratic Party largely rejected liberalism on civil liberties, as it would 
have likely alienated important voting blocs. 132 Further, in contrast 
with economic policy, civil liberties were only beginning to become 
prominent on the Court's agenda and, in any event, were not a pri-
ority for Roosevelt.13 3 
Policy considerations were less important to the next three Dem-
ocratic presidents, HarryTnm1an (1945- 53),Jolm Kennedy (1961-63), 
and Lyndon Jolmson (1963-69). Although Roosevelt chose nominees 
primarily from his circle of personal and political acquaintances, 13+ his 
Democratic successors gave even more weight to their personal and 
political ties with prospective nominees to the Court. Ideology clearly 
played a secondary role. 
This was especially true of Truman, who gave particular emphasis 
to personal ties with nominees. 135 Because of his indifference to 
ideological considerations, the liberal Truman appointed four rela-
tively conservative Justices to the Court. 136 Personal connections also 
"" J eff Shesol, Supreme Po-wer: Fnmldin Roo.,·evelr vs. Tbe Supreme Court (W. W. N orton, 
20 11 ). 
111 Lenchtenburg, 7/Je Supreme Court Rebom at 154 (cited in note 31). 
" ' Sec Hans N oel, Politimlldeologies mul Political Panies in America 37 (Cambridge, 2013). 
1
" Sec notes 51 - 53 and accompanying text (highlighting divergent views of Roosevelt ap-
pointees on civil li benies) . See generally Pritchett, Tbe Roosevelt Court (cited in note 44); C. 
Herman Pritchett, Civil Liberties and tbe Vinson Court (Chicago, 1954). 
11
•
1 
"Nearly all of the Justices chosen by Pres idents Frankl in Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, 
and Johnson had at least a fairly confidential relationship with them prior to their appoint-
ment." Ro bert Scigl iano, Tbe Supreme Coun and rbe Presidency 95 (Free Press , 197 1). 
1
" In one leading analysis of presidents' appoinm1ent strategies, the chapter on Truman is 
entitled "Truman Rewards Loya lty and Friendship." David Alistair Ya lof, Pun·uit oj']ustice.1·: 
Presidemial Politin· mul tbe Scleaio11 of Supreme Coun Nmninces 20- 40 (Chicago, 1999). 
Truman was a parry-centrist whose main concern was presiding over a factionalized Dem-
ocratic .Party. Sec Nelson Lichtenstein , From Co1pomtis11t to Collective Brl1'gaiuing: Orgrmizetl 
Labm· ami tbe Eclipse ofSodrrl Democrmy in tbe Postwrtr Em, excerpted in Steve Fraser and Gary 
Gerstle, eds, Tbe Ri.~e and Fall oftbe NL'IV Deal Order, 1930- 1980, 122- 52 (Princeton, 1989). 
1
" ' Based on tl1 c coding of votes in the Supreme Comt Database (see note 28), all four 
Truman appointees ranked above tl1e median among Justices serving in tl1e 193 7- 2006 
T erms for tl1 eir proportions of conserva tive votes. With the exception of C lark, all were well 
above tl1e median. Landes and Posner, 1 J Legal Analys is at 782- 83 (cited in note 31). Among 
Justices who served in the 1946- 85 T erms, the Truman appoi ntees have similar rankings in 
civil liberti es cases, with voting scores modified in an effort to take into account change in tl1e 
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explain John F. Kennedy's appointments of Byron White and Arthur 
Goldberg. Both were members of his Cabinet, and Kennedy had 
long-standing ties with White. Indeed, White wrote the intelligence 
report on the sinking of a boat that Kennedy piloted during World 
War Il. 137 
Lyndon Johnson also had close ties to Abe Fortas, whom he ap-
pointed to the Court in 1965 and unsuccessfully nominated for Chief 
Justice three years later, and to Homer Thornberry, whose 1968 
nomination became moot when Fortas failed to win confirmation as 
Chief Justice. Both were personal friends of Johnson, and Fortas 
served Johnson as an informal but close advisor. 138 Thurgood Mar-
shall, appointed to the Court in 1967, was Johnson's Solicitor Gen-
eral, and his appointment also reflected the political value of choosing 
the first Mrican American Justice. 
While Truman may have been indifferent to ideology in choosing 
nominees, Ke1medy and Johnson were not. Kennedy, for example. 
considered elevating federal judge William Hastie to the Supreme 
Court; had Hastie been nominated and confirmed, he would have 
become the first African American Justice. But Kennedy chose not to 
make the nomination, and it appears that Hastie's relative modera-
tion played a role in that decision.139 
In general, though, these presidents did not emphasize ideology 
in their selection of]ustices. There was therefore considerable room 
for variation in the ideological orientations of their nominees. Largely 
because the Democratic Party of that era included many conservative 
southerners, it was ideologically heterogeneous. 140 Although the Jus-
tices appointed by Democratic presidents from Roosevelt through 
Johnson tended on average to be fairly liberal, the relatively low pri-
ority that most of those presidents gave to ideology resulted in a set 
of Justices who were mixed in their ideological views. 
composition of cases over time. Lawrence Baum, Comptn-ing rbe Policy Posir.iom of Sup1·ww 
Coun Jmrices jiwn Diffircut Periods, 42 Western Pol Q 509, 511 (1989). 
137 Henry]. Abraham, Justices 111111 Prcsidcms 275 (Rowman and Littlefield, 2d eel 1985). 
13
" Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A lliogmpby 199- 227 ( Y;1 le, 1990). 
1.1'' Sheldon Goldman, Picking Fctlernl Judges: Lower Comt Selecriou from Roosevelt Tbrougb 
Reagan 166 (Yale, 1999). 
140 See Stefanic A. Lindquist, David A. Yalof, and John A. Clark, Tbe Impact of Presidential 
Appoimmems to tbe U.S. Supreme Court: Cobesive rmd Divisive Voting <vitbiu PresidemiallJ/ocs, 53 
Pol Res Q 795 (2000) . 
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2. Clinton and Obmna. BillClinton(1993-2001)andBarackObama 
(2009-17) each made two appointments to the Supreme Court. The 
Clinton-Obama approach differed considerably from that of Tru-
man, Kennedy, and Johnson. Clinton and Obama were careful to 
select nominees whose records gave strong evidence of liberalism. 
Clinton, for example, drew from "a pool of mostly liberal and Dem-
ocratic candidates" and seriously considered liberal criticisms of Gins-
burg's position on abortion. 14 1 Before choosing Sonia Sotomayor in 
2009, Obama read long memoranda on the leading candidates and 
"kept asking for more original writings by the candidates."142 
Nonetheless, ideology did not play a determinative role in the Clin-
ton and Obama nominations. Instead, both presidents veered away 
from nominees whose strong liberalism would prompt confirmation 
battles and toward nominees who embraced the rhetoric of judicial 
restraint, had rich personal histories, and were perceived as relatively 
moderate in their views. 1•13 When nominating Merrick Garland to fi ll 
Antonin Scalia's seat, for example, Obama was well aware of Senate 
141 Ya lof, Pursuit of.Jmtice.,· at 196 (cited in note 13 5). See also J effrey Toobin , Tl1e Ni11e: 
l11side tbe Sm-et World of tbe Supn:me Court 70- 71 (Anchor, 2007) . At the same time, Clinton 
identified as a cenu·ist "New Democrat," and disavowed severa l liberal positions. See Gross-
man and Hopkins, ri.lymmerric Politics at 225- 26 (cited in note 77). 
141 Peter Baker and Adam Nagourney, Tigbt Lid Defiued Process in Seleai11g r1 Ne-~v ]ustice, 
NY Times at A 17 (May 28, 2009). 
143 O n Ginsburg, see El izabeth Drew, On tbe Edge: Tbe Clinton Presidemy 2 17- 18 (Touch-
stone, 1995); T oo bin, Tbe Nine at 70 (c ited in note 141). Clin ton also thought it important that 
G insburg was championed by Senator Daniel Pao·ick Moynihan (D-NY), who held consid-
erable influence over proposed health care legislation. Id. On the unhappiness of some liberals 
about Breyer 's appointment, see Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Conflict: Tbe lm'ide Stmy of 
Tbe Stmggle for Control of Tbe United States Supreme Court 182 (Penguin , 2007). O n Breyer's 
Li es to infl uentia l Republ icans, see Drew, On tbe Edge at 214. O n Obama's appointments, see 
PcLer A. Baker, Favorites of Left Don't Mnke Obrmw'.,· Court List, NY Times at A12 (May 26, 
2009), and Jef'li-ey T oobin, Bencb Press: rh·e Obmnn's]udges Re11/ly l.ibeml?, New Yorker (Sept 2 l , 
2009). More genera lly, Obama "paid less :mention" to the oppornmity to use judicial ap-
pointments Lo appoint young lawyers who "could make significan t marks on the law" than 
did Ronald Reagan and his Repub lican successors. J effrey Too bin, Obrmw's Unjiuisbed Judicial 
Legmy, New Yorker (Ju ly 31, 20 12), available at http://www. newyorker.com/news/daily-com 
mcnt!obaiiias-unfinished-judicial- legacy. 
Scores developed by Jeffi·ey Segal and Albert Cover measure perceptions of Supreme Court 
nominees' ideological positions in newspaper editorials after thei r nominations. T he scores 
range from 0.0 at the conservative end to 1.0 atthe liberal encl. T he Segal-Caver scores for these 
four nominees underline the difference: .680 for Gi nsburg, .475 for Breyer, .780 for Soto-
mayor, and .73 0 for Kagan. By c01mast, Roberts's score was .120 and Ali to's .100. See Jeffi·ey A. 
Segal and Albert D. Cover, ldeologiwl VII lues 1/1/(l tbe Votes of U.S. Sup1·eme Court .Justices, 83 Am 
Pol Sci Rev 5 57 (1989). T he scores ca n be found at h ttp://www.stonybrook.ecln/polsci/jsegall. 
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Republican threats to derail any nomination. '++ Acknowledging that 
Garland was "just the right nominee during such a divisive time in our 
politics,"145 Obama selected a sixty-three-year-old moderate-liberal 
who stood a better chance of confirmation than any other candi-
date.1 46 Reflecting the tendency of Democrats to place interest group 
politics ahead of ideology, 1+7 Clinton and Obama also put substantial 
emphasis on racial and gender diversity in their judicial nominations, 
i11cluding Supreme Court appointments. 14H As Mark Tuslmet has ob-
served, "Democratic presidents tend to pursue a demographic strategy 
rather than an ideological one for Supreme Court nominations." 14? 
One way to characterize the Clinton-Obama appointments is that, 
in comparison with the appointments of earlier Democratic admin-
istrations, the average ideological position has not changed a great 
deal, but the variation has been reduced. Unlike earlier Democrats 
(who appointed both strong liberals and conservatives), the Clinton-
144 See Gregory Korte, I-lo1v Obmna Ph-ked Mm·h·k Gadand for La.rt Supreme Court Pick, 
USA Today (March 17, 2016), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/poli tics 
/2 016/03/ 16/wh.ite-house-garland-obamas- fi rst-choice-supreme-courr/81 866606/; Lawrence 
Baum and Nea l Devins, ldeologiml Imbalance: Wby De-~notTats Uwally Pick JW.odemte-Libeml 
Justices mul l?epublicans Umally Pick Conservative Ones, Slate (March [ 7, 20 16), avai lable at 
h. np:/ /www .slate .com/ articles/news_an d_pol i tics/ju risprudence/2 0 16/0 3/ clemocra ts_a lwa ys 
_pick_Inoderates_like_merrick_garlancl.hnnl . 
1
'
15 Korte, 1-fwv Obm11rt Picked Merrick Garland (cited in note 144) (quoting Deputy White 
House Press Secretary Eric Schultz). 
146 See Adam Liptak, Wbere J\!Ten·ick Gadrmd Stmul.r: A Close Look at J-Iis Judicial Ram·r/, 
NY Times (March 17, 2016), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/us/poli tics 
/merrick-garlands-rccord-and-st)de-hint-at-his-appeal.hun l; Matthew Yglesias, Tbe Real Rea-
son President Obm1111 Appointed i\llerrick Gadaud, Vox (March 18, 2016), available at hup:// 
www.vox.com/20 16/3/L 8/ L 126 L 416/why-obama-picked-garland. For a similar assessment of 
why Hi llary Clinton might have reappointed Garland, see J oan Biskupic, WI~)' MerriL·k Gar-
land Sbould Keep 1-loping, CNN Politics (Oct 23, 2016), available at http://www.cnn.com/20 16 
I l 0/2 3/poli tics/h illary-clin ton -merrick -ga rla nd-supreme-cou rtf. 
H? See Matt Grossman and David A. Hopkins, ldeologiwl Republiwn tmd Group ]merest 
Democmts, 13 Persp on Pol 119 (2015). Democrats are limited in their pursuit of ideology, in 
part, because Democrats are not dominated by a single interest group; instead, Democrats 
advance the interests of a pro-government coalition that includes interest groups interested in 
the environment, economic inequality, race, and much more. See id at 119- 20, 134-35. 
'
4
" See J effrey Toobin, Obrnna's Uujinislml Judicial Legacy, New Yorker (July 3 L, 20 12), 
avai lable at http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-conunentlobmnas-wlfinished-judicial -legacy 
(noring that "half of [Obama's] successflil nominees have been women (compared to twenty-three 
per cent for Bush Jl), and nineteen per cent have been Afi·icm1 American (compared to seven per 
cent for Bush Jl)''); Sheldon Goldman and Matthew D . Sm·onson, Climou's Nou-Tmrlitioual}ttrlges: 
Cmttiug 11 i\tlore Represmtative Brrmcb, 78 Judicamre 68 (1994). 
149 Tushnet, ln tbe Balauce at 74 (cited in note 21). 
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Obama appointees were all moderate liberals. A measure of]ustices' 
ideological positions by year that was devised by Michael Bailey 
confirms this conclusion. 150 His measure pertains to civil liberties 
cases and covers the period from 1951 to 2011. A score of 1.22 is the 
most conservative in a particular year for any Justice in his study, and 
- 1.87 the most liberal. 15 1 For the Democratic appointees who served 
during the study period, the average of their mean scores across terms 
was -0.55 for the Obama and Clinton appointees and - 0.24, a little 
less liberal, for tl1e Justices appointed by the presidents from Roose-
velt to Johnson. But the Clinton and Obama appointees were clus-
tered together, with a standard deviation of only .09 in tl1eir scores; 152 
in contrast, their predecessors had a standard deviation of 1.03. Of the 
thirteen pre-Clinton Democratic appointees, five were more liberal 
tl1an any of tl1e Clinton and Obama Justices, and eight were more 
conservative tl1an any of tl1em. T hus, the Obama and Clinton ap-
pointees have contributed to partisan polarization of the Court by 
standing on tl1e libera l side of tl1e ideological spectrum, but they have 
adhered to a position of moderate ratl1er than strong liberalism. More 
to the point, recent Democratic appointees to the Court do not re-
flect tl1e sharp leftward shift of Democratic elites discussed in Part II. 
Instead, because Clinton and Obama valued interest group politics as 
much as ideology, they did not appoint strong liberals to the Court. 
Indeed, none of their nominees was as liberal as William 0. Douglas, 
Earl Warren, William]. Brennan, Abe Fortas, Arthur Goldberg, or 
Thurgood Marshal l. 
150 T he scores are compi led at http://facu lty.georgetown.edu/baileyma!JOPidealPoin tsJan 
20I3 .hon. The method for creating them is discussed in Michae l A. Bailey, Is Todafs Court 
rbe MoJ·t Conservmive in Sixty Vem·s? Cballenges and Opportunities in l\l[easuring Judicial PreF 
emnes, 75 J Pol 82 1 (20l3). Because these scores were compiled only through calendar year 
20 11 , only two terms are ava ilable for Justice Sotomayor and one term for Justice Kagan, but 
the stability of their voting records relative to their colleagues since that time indicates that 
the ir scores over a more extended period would be similar. 
151 Calcnlations in this paragraph were prepared by the authors based on scores compiled 
by Bailey. 
152 O bama 's March 20 16 nomination of Merrick Garland conforms to this practice. See 
Baum and Devins, Ideo!ogiwl hnbalauce (cited in note 144). For example, ideological measures 
of Ga rland locate him smack in the middle of Climon-Obama Democratic appointees. See 
Adam Lipmk and Alicia Palapiano, How Clinton's or 'Thnup's Nominees Could Ajj'ea tbe Balance 
of tbe Supreme Court, NY T imes (Sept 25, 2016), ava ilable at http://www.nytimes.com/in 
teractive/2 0 16/09/2 5/us/poli tics/how-clin tons-or-trurnps-nominees-cou ld-a ffect-th e-bal 
ancc-of-the-suprcme-con rt.html? _r = 0. 
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B. REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS 
The changes in appointment strategies on the Republican side 
have been more dramatic. That difference reflects a more funda-
mental change in the role of ideology in the Republican Party. 
1. From Eisenhowe7' to Ford. In contrast with Democratic presidents 
during the period from the 1930s through the 1960s, Republicans 
Dwight Eisenhower and Gerald Ford focused neither on personal 
relationships with nominees nor on policy considerations. Eisen-
hower named Earl Warren Chief]ustice in 1953 to pay back a political 
debt for crucial support that the Warren-led California delegation 
had provided to him at the 195 2 Republican Party convention. 153 The 
choice of William Brennan in October 1956 was motivated primarily 
by the perceived electoral advantages of choosing a Catholic Demo-
crat. I 54 
Gerald Ford's appointment of]ohn Paul Stevens in 1975 was un-
usual in that personal, political, and ideological considerations played 
essentially no role in his decision. Ford delegated the selection of 
a nominee to Attorney General Edward Levi, asking him to focus 
on the qualifications of prospective nominees. Ford's approach can 
be tmderstood in part as a response to Watergate, and especially to 
abuses in the Justice Department. 155 
President Richard Nixon's approach was more ambiguous. When 
running for president in 1968, Nixon sharply criticized the decisions 
of the Warren Court.156 Once in office, Nixon sought to woo con-
'" Abraham, ]m1ice.r nml Presidents at 200- 02 (ci ted in note 13 7); Yalof, Pursuit oj]m1.ices at 
44- 45 (c ited in note 135). 
IH C hristine L. Nemacheck, StTntegic Selection: Presidential Nomiuation of Supreme Court 
Justices _fi-om !-lcrbert Hoover Tbmngb Ge01ge W Bush 49 (Virgi nia, 2007); Abraham, ]ustices 
and Pt-esidems at 208 (cited in note 137); Yalof, Pun uit of Justices at 55- 56, 61 (cited in note 
135). T he Segal-Cover scores for Warren and llrennan were .750 and 1.000, respectively. 
Segal and Cover, 83 Am Pol Sci Rev (cited in note 143). Eisenhower's disappointment with 
Warren ancll3rennan led him to give attention to ideology in his second-term appointments 
of C harles Whittaker (1957) and Potter Stewart (1958), but even in those instlmces the policy 
preferences of prospective nominees were considered to only a limited degree. Yalof, Pur.mit 
of]rmices at 61- 69 (cited in note 135). 
155 Ya lof, Punuit of]ustices at 125- 31 (cited in note 135); Abraham, .'fustices, Presidems, mul 
Seuatonat 160- 61 (cited in note 127). Levi and Stevens did have a long personal relationship, 
elating back to elementa ry schoo l. George L. Priest and W illiam Ranney Levi,Jusria Srevens, 
Ethvrml Levi, and tbe Cbimgo Scbool of Antitrust, Nat' I L Rev (May 24, 20 l 0), ava ibble at 
http://www .Ia w. uch i ca go .edu/ news/] ustice-stevens-edward -I evi -and-chi ca go-schoo 1-a n ri 
trust. 
I % Donald Grier Stephenson, Jr., Cmupaigns and tbe Coun: 77Je U.S. Supreme Court iu 
Presidemial Eleaion.r 179- 82 (Columbia, 1999). 
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servatives to the Republican Party by emphasizing several policy 
concerns, including criminal justice and school busing, relating to the 
Court. 157 At the same time, though, Nixon was careful not to alienate 
northern moderates who were still important to the Republican 
Party. Nixon's Supreme Court appointments reflected those some-
times conflicting goals: he soughtJustices with conservative positions 
on the issues that were politically important to him, but he sought 
"ideological conformity" only on criminal justice and busing, and he 
was not interested in appointing a "hardliner." 15H In other words, 
"politics far more than ideology drove all six of [Nixon's] choices for 
the Court." 1 5 ~ 
2. From Reagan to Ge01'ge W Busb. The Reagan administration broke 
ranks with its predecessors by making ideological considerations "the 
most important criteria" in the screening of judicial candidates, 
seeking to reshape Supreme Court decision making by sponsoring 
"ardently conservative candidates to the high court."160 Unlike Roose-
velt, who focused specifically on economic regulation, and Nixon, who 
focused specifically on criminal justice and school busing, Reagan 
sought to fundamentally transform the role of tl1e Supreme Court. 161 
Ideology played a dominant role in his nominations of such conser-
vative stalwarts as Al1tonin Scalia, Robert Bork, Douglas Ginsburg, 
and (as Chief]ustice) William Rehnquist. 162 
157 Kevi n J. McMahon, Nixon's Courr: His Challenge to Judicial Libem/i.1711 am/Its Political 
Consequmces (Chicago, 20 II). 
'
5
" Eric A. Posner, Ca.wal with the Courr, N ew Republic (Oct 24, 2011), at https:// 
ncwrepublic.com/article/94516/n.ixons-coun-kevin-nlcmahon (reviewing McMahon, Nixou:r 
Coun (cited in note l 57)). 
'
5
'' McM.ahon, Nixon's Court at 6 (cited in note 157). Nixon White House Cou nsel John 
Dean 's accoum of the chaotic process through which several of the Nixon nominations were 
made also underlines th e lack of a systematic effort w choose nominees on the basis of their 
policy positions. See John W. Dean, The Relmquist Cboice: The Umold Story of the Nixon 
Appointment 1l1at Redefin ed the Supr·eme Court (Free Press, 2002). 
"·" Y:1lof, Pm·.wit of]usthes :It 134 (cited in note l 35). 
'"' See Ke ith E. VVhi ttington, Politiwl Fomulations of]wlicial Sup1·emtu:y: The Presidency, tbe 
Supreme Cma·t, mul Comtitutional Letlllen·hip in U.S. History 89 (Princeton, 2009). See also 
John C. Hughes, Tbe Fet!eml Courrs, Politin, mul the Rule of Law 74 (Harpercollins, 1995) 
(cla iming tha t Reagan had been elected on a wave of conservative populism, and he "could 
not afford to be indifferent to the couns") . 
'"
2 See Yalof, Punuit of]usthes at 142- 65 (cited in note 135). All four had markedly con-
servative records on the federal appell aLe courts. Reflecting perceptions of those records, tl1c 
Segai-Cover scores (Segal and Cover, 83 Am Pol Sci Rev (ci ted in note 143)) for the four 
nominees were all below . l 00. 
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Ideology also played a central role in the appointment strategies 
of Republicans George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. George 
H. W. Bush chose Clarence Thomas in part to maintain African 
American representation on the Court, but Thomas also had a very 
strong record of conservatism. By nominating john Roberts, Harriet 
Miers, and Samuel Alito in 2005, George W. Bush sought to select 
the "most conservative possible Supreme Court Justice." 163 More 
striking, he put the desires of conservative leaders ahead of his own 
preferences. In particular, well-placed staunch conservatives were 
able to secure the withdrawal of Harriet Miers 164-even though she 
was a trusted personal and political associate of Bush 165 and someone 
the president thought was strongly conservative. 166 Staunch conser-
vatives-especially those for whom abortion was a high priority-
had already succeeded in preventing the nom.ination of Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales, another close associate of the president, 
for the same seat on the Court. 167 
It is important to note, though, that ideology was not the only cri-
terion that these Republican presidents took into account. In nom-
inating Sandra Day O'Connor, Reagan honored a campaign pledge 
to nominate a woman, 168 and when nominating Anthony Kennedy in 
1987 and David Souter in 1990, the Reagan and George H. W. Bush 
administrations went out of their way to avoid potentially bruising 
confirmation battles. 169 
16J Toobin, T!J e Nine at 345 (cited in note 141). 
"''
1 See notes 185- 90 and accompanying text. 
165 Before becoming White House counsel, i\lliers had served as Bush's personal attorney. 
See Toobin, T!Jc Nine at 286-87 (cited in note 141). 
161
' For Bush, Miers was the perfect "stealth" candidate- like 0;1Vid Souter but without the 
risk. See Steve Holland, Busb Dcjimds Pick for Supre111e Court, Toronto Star at A 11 (Oct 5, 
2005) (quoti ng Bush as saying "there's not a lot of opinions for people to look at"). 
"'' Toobin, 7YJC Nine at 266- 70 (cited in note 141). The importance ofrhe abortion issue in 
the blocking of a Gonza les nomination and in Miers's nominatjon is di scussed in Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Se:x: and tbe Comtiwtion 423- 24 (Liveright, 20 17). 
16
" Douglas E. Kneeland, Reagan Pledges Vf/o7!len on Court; Carter Cballeuges Foe on Et:ouomy, 
NY Times at A I (Oct 15, 1980). On the array of considerations that may have affected the 
choice of O'Connor, see Nemacheck, St'l"fltegic Selection at 9- 13 (cited in note 154). 
1
"" Although administntion insiders thought Kennedy and Souter were solid conservatives, 
they were chosen over more conservative alternatives- and, in Ke1medy's case, after two of 
those alternatives were nominated or announced as a nominee but not confirmed. See Yn lof, 
Pun uit of Justices at 145- 46, 164 (cited in note 13 5) (d iscussing Kem1edy); Jnmes MacGregor 
Burns, Pm·king tbe Com1: 'l7;e Rise of Jwlicifll Powe1· mul the Comiug C1·i.ri.r of tbe Supreme Court 
217 (Penguin , 2009) (d iscussing Souter). 
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Despite these exceptions, the overall shift in emphasis in the ap-
pointment strategies of these three Republican presidents was largely 
the product of the political and judicial priorities of their adminis-
trations, priorities that were shaped in no small part by the emergence 
of a new conservative legal movement. 
After Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the Reagan Justice De-
partment began grooming a cadre of well-credentialed conservative 
lawyers in an effort to transform both constitutional discourse and 
judicial decision making. Under the leadership of Attorney General 
Edwin Meese, the Department of Justice in Reagan's second term 
sought aggressively to advance conservative goals in the judiciary. 170 
Recognizing that the "project of getting the Constitution right was 
more than just appointing judges, and that we had to have a rhetoric 
that was persuasive, and an analysis that became talked about by 
public intellectuals," 17 1 Meese formally embraced the "Jurisprudence 
of Original Intention." 172 He gave speeches, organized seminars on 
originalism within the department, and directed his Office of Legal 
Policy to issue Guidelinesfm' Constitutional Litigation to enable Justice 
Department attorneys to adhere to the principles of originalism in 
their legal analyses and arguments. 173 In these and other ways, Meese 
sought to "facilitate the orderly development of conservative legal 
ideals and their injection into the mainstream." 174 
Meese also sought to staff the Justice Department with young 
conservative lawyers- making "ideological commitment ... a cre-
dential rather than a disqualification." 175 The recently established 
Federalist Society was an important component of this strategy, be-
170 Meese became Attorney General in !985 . First- term Attorney General William French 
Smith also embraced conservative ideals but did not pursue long-term objectives. Sec 
W illiam French Smith , UTging Judicial Restmim, 68 AJ3A J 59 (1982); T eles, Tnmsformrtrive 
Bm-erlllcrrny at 66- 69 (cited in note 10). 
171 T elcs, 'Fim1.1jimnruive Burenucrncy at 76 (cited in note 10) (quoting Kenneth Cribb, who 
served as Counselor Lo the Attorney General). 
11
' i\t:torney General Edwin Meese, Address Before the American Bar Association, The 
Supreme Comt oftb e United States: Buhvrtrk ofn Limited Coustitlltiou (July 9, 1985), available at 
http://www. fed-soc.org/pu blications/ deta illrhe-grea t-deba te-a ttorn ey-general-ed-meese-i ii 
-july-9-1985. Sec also T eles, Tnmsfimnntive Brwermm ny at 80- 81 (cited in note 10) (noting 
that the "critical LlJrning point in the deve lopment o f originalism" was a lunch-time talk by 
then- D.C. C ircui t Judge Anton in Scalia to DoJ political appointees). 
173 Tcles, 'lim1.jimuative Buretmcntcy at 75- 82 (cited in note !0). 
' H ' l'eles, Conservative Legal Mowmellt at 136 (cited in note 13). 
175 T eles, 'Ji-tnJrjimurttive llureamntcy at 74 (cited in note I 0). 
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cause it enabled Meese and others in the administration to identify 
promising candidates for positions both in the Department of Jus-
tice and on the courts. Meese hired the society's founders as special 
assistants and tapped Stephen Markman, who headed the Wash-
ington, D.C. chapter of the Federalist Society, to become the As-
sistant Attorney General in charge of judicial selection.176 
The George H. W. Bush administration followed the Reagan ad-
ministrati.on's lead. The administration looked to Lee Liberman 
Otis, co-founder of the Federalist Society, to lead its judicial selection 
process. 177 Both administrations aimed to nominate conservative 
judges, and membership in the Federalist Society was a proxy for 
adherence to conservative ideology. Reagan made all three of the 
society's original faculty advisors federal court judges and nominated 
two of the three-Robert Bork and Antonin Scali a-to the Supreme 
Court. 178 Nine of President George H. W. Bush's fifty-five 179 nom-
inees to the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court were 
Federalist Society members (including Clarence Thomas, Samuel 
Ali to, and John Roberts). 1H0 
At the same time, the Reagan and George W. Bush administra-
tions were limited in their ability to nominate reliable conservatives. 
They did not yet have a "farm team" of conservatives who had joined 
the Federalist Society as law students and cut their teeth either 
17
" Id at 68, 74. T he Federa list Society was established in 1982 by conservative Yale and 
University of Chicago law st1.1dents who felt "alienated from the prevailing political Ot·ien-
tation of their classmates and their schools." Avery and McLaughlin, The Federrtlist Society at 1 
(cited in note 118). See also Southworth , Lmvyer.1· of rbe Rigbt at 124- 48 (cited in note 116). 
177 Teles, Rise of tbc Couservlltive Legal Moveutent (ci ted in note 13). 
"" Nancy Scherer and Banks Mi ller, Tbc Fedemlisr Society's luflueuce ou rbe Fed em/ Judicill1)', 
62 Pol Res Q 366, 367 (2009). 
m George H. \V. Bush nominated 6rty-three individuals to U.S. Circuit Courts, see Denis 
Steven Rutkus et al, Cong Research Serv, RL31868, U.S. Cinuit mul Di.w·ict Court Nom-
inatious by Prn idmr Ge01ge W. Busb Duriug tbe 107tb- 109rb Congresses 30 (2007) (listing the 
number of U.S. Circu it Court nominees of recent presidents), and two individuals to the U.S. 
Supreme Coun, see US Sena te, Supreme Court Nominations, present- 1789, avnilablc at 
http:/ /www.senatc.gov/pagelayoutlreference/nomina tions/ N OJ nina tions.htm. 
' "
0 lei . (Roberts's 1992 nomination was not acted on by the Semlte. Alito was con6rmed to 
the T hi rd Circuit, T homas to the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court.) At the time of Roberts's 
2005 nomination to the Supreme Court, there was some uncertaimy about whether he had 
ever been an official member of the Federalist Society, and Roberts reported tl1at he did not 
remember being a member. Charles Lane, Fedemlisr Affiliatiou J\lfisJt!ltet!; Robe1·rs Does Not 
Belong ro Group, Wash Post at A 16 (July 21, 2005); Charles Lme, Roberts Listed iu Fedemlisr 
Society '97- 98 Diret"t01)'; Com·r Directo1·; Court Said 1-h Has No i\111!'11107)' of Nlmdm:l'bip, Wash 
Post at AI (July 25, 2005). Bm Roberts has had ties witl1 tl1e society since his Supreme Court 
appointment. 
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clerking for a conservative judge or working as a government at-
torney. As Reagan Justice Department official Richard Willard ex-
plained, "these were the days before the Federalist Society was really 
off the grOtmd, so it was hard to find lawyers who had a conservative 
political outlook. At that time, tl1e law schools and the professional 
associations were overwhelmingly liberal in their outlook, and so 
finding conservative lawyers who had the outlook, but also the pro-
fessional competence, to do the job, was a challenge." 1H1 
By tl1e time George W. Bush became president in 2001, tl1ough, 
the conservative legal movement dominated Department of Justice 
and judicial appointments. Not only did Federalist Society mem-
bers play "key roles in selecting, vetting, and shepherding nominees 
tl1r0t1gh the confirmation process" during tl1e George W. Bush ad-
ministration, but legal positions in tl1e administration were over-
whelmingly filled by members of the Federalist Society.182 The ad-
ministration tapped Federalist Society members Brett Kavanaugh 
and Viet Dinh to be in charge of judicial selection.183 By 2005, the 
"farm team" of credentialed conservatives included John Roberts 
and Samuel Alito, and approximately half of George W . Bush's ap-
pointees to the federal courts of appeals were members of the Fed-
eralist Society.1H4 
The nomination and withdrawal of Supreme Court nominee Har-
ri et Miers vividly illustrates botl1 tl1e power of tl1e conservative legal 
movement and the depth of the current pool of potential conserva-
tive Supreme Court nominees. Determined "not to repeat his fa-
ther's mistake with Souter," Bush had the backing of Leonard Leo, 
the executive vice president of the Federalist Society.185 Nonetheless, 
tl1e reaction to tl1e Miers nomination from tl1e conservative legal 
'"'Quoted in Teles, 'Ti mBjomtfltive Burerwcmcy at 70- 71 (cited in note 10). See also id at 73 
(noting Kenneth C ribb's comment to Attorney General Meese that "there aren't enough gray 
haired people who agree with us" to staff critica l positions). 
"
12 H oll is-Brusky, Ideas 1vitb Cousequeuces at 154 (cited in note 13). According to Daniel 
Troy, Federalist Society member and Bush-appoimed counsel to the FDA, "Everybody, I 
me:1 n everybody who got a job who was a lawyer was involved wi th the Federalist Society. I 
mean everybody." Id (quoting Troy) . 
'A' Michae l Avery and Danielle McLaughlin, Ho1v Conservatives Capl.'llred tbe Lmv, Chron 
Higher Educ (Apr 15, 201 3). 
'"·' Jd; Scherer and Mi ller, 62 Pol Res Qat 368 (cited in note 178) (noting tha t around two-
thirds of Bush's first-term judicial nominees were Federalist Society members). 
'"' Greenburg, Supnmte Conflia at 265 (cited in note 143). 
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establishment was "immediate, harsh, and po.inted." 186 Attacking her 
both for her lack of Federalist Society "credentials" 187 and for her ties 
to the American Bar Association (which conservatives had turned 
against as too liberal in its screening of judges), 188 conservatives 
demanded that Miers withdraw and be replaced by a nominee from 
the "deep farm team of superbly qualified and talented circuit court 
judges primed for this moment." 189 Twenty-four days after her 
nomination, with conservative criticism unabated, .iVIiers withdrew. 
Her replacement was Samuel Alito-a Federalist Society member 
and the favorite of the very conservatives who had attacked Miers. 190 
With four Federalist Society members sitting on the Supreme 
Court from 2006 to 2016, there is little question that the society has 
become a "mediating institution" for legal conservatives, helping to 
maintain "channels of communication through which individuals and 
organizations can exercise political influence." 191 Indeed, when 2016 
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump sought to establish 
his bona fides with the conservative legal network, he consulted with 
Federalist Society leadership in assembling his lists of potential Su-
'"'' Teles, Couservative Legal Movement at 1 (cited in note 13). See generally G reenburg, 
Supmne Conflict at 263- 84 (cited in note 143). 
' "
7 See Holl is- Brusky, Ideas 1vith Couscquences at 153 (cited in note 13) (quoting Federalist 
Society member Tony Cotto as saying "No Feel Society credentials, that's go ing to hurt you. It 
hurt Harriet (Miers] a lot. .. . We want credentials. We want to see you've spoken at Federalist 
Society conferences, we want to !mow you've been to di1mers, gripping nne! grinning"). 
'"" On Miers's ties to the ABA, see lvlien v The Fedemlist Society, Daily Kos (Oct 7, 2005, 
2:5 3 p.m.), archived at http://www.clailykos.com/story/2005/10/07 /15 5092/-Miers-v-The-Fecl 
era list-Society (quoting a post on the Volokh C071spiracy by Jim Lindgren). On conse1vative 
disapproval of the ABA (including the George \V. Bush adminisu·ation's refusa l to seek ABA 
screening of judicia l nominees), see Teles, Couse1V11tive Legal lvlovemmt at 167- 73 (cited in nor.e 
13). 
'"''Todd Zywicki, A Grertt Mind, 28 Legal Times (Oct 10, 2005), archived at https://perma 
.cc/LHK7-2JGB. See also Randy E. Barnett, C1'01~)'i.l"'lt, Wnll StJ, A26 (Oct 5, 2005) (sug-
gesting that M iers lacked "a firm grasp on constitlJtional text, history and principles" as well 
as the abil ity to "resist the severe pressure brought by Congress, by the executive branch, by 
state and locnl governments, and also by fell ow Justices to exceed the Constitution's limits on 
government power"); Michael A. Fletcher and Charles Babington, IHim·, Uut!er Fire fi'mn 
Rigbt, Witbdmwn as Court Nominee, Wash Post (Oct 28, 2005), archived at https://perma.cc 
/X7i\IIP-EMAW. 
' '"' See Greenburg, Supreme Conflict at 269-70 (cited in note 143) (recounting story of 
form er Reagan officia l Mike Carvin 's strong support of Alita and opposition to Miers); sec 
also Peter Baker, A /ito Nominmion Sets Stage for ldeologiml Battle, \Vash Post (Nov 1, 2005), 
archived at https://perma.cc/9D5E-92UA ("Conservative leaders who helped force Miers to 
pull out Thmsday rejoiced at the selection, seeing in Alita the philosophical equivalent of 
Justice Amonin Scalia."). 
' '"Southworth , Lawyers oftbe Rigbr: at 135, 141 (cited in note 116). 
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preme Court nominees.192 And when the society held its annual 
N ational Lawyers Convention a week after the 2016 election, nine of 
the twenty-one judges on that list were among the speakers and 
"nearly all the others" were in attendance.19J T oday, membership in 
the Federalist Society is critical to the credentialing of conservative 
lawyers. Michael Greve put it this way: "[Ojn the left there are a 
million ways of getting credentialed; on the political right there's on ly 
one way in these legal circles." 194 
IV. TI-IE JusTICES IN THEIR Soc iAL E NVIRON MENT S 
In this part, we focus on the social environments of the Jus-
tices, that is, the individuals and groups with whom the Justices in-
teract directly or indirectly and whose regard the Justices care about. 
We argue tl1at a Justice's social environment can exert significant 
influence on his or her jurisprudence. 
A. THE JUSTICES' SOCIAL IDENTITIES 
In addition to the goal of making sound legal decisions, Supreme 
Court Justices have other interests and values that affect their judi-
cial behavior. 195 Like other people, tl1ey have social identities, 1<)6 and 
'"' See Alan Rappeport and C harlie Savage, Donald Trump Releases List ofPo.l'sible Supreme 
Court Phks, NY Times (May 18, 201 6), available at lm p:l/www.nytimes.corn/2016/05/19/us 
/ poli tics/donald-mnnp-supreme-court-nominees.html? _r = 0; Bob Woodward and Robert 
Costa , Iu 11 Revealing lmervh"'v, Tm711p Predias a j\t[assive Recession but lnteudl' to Elimiuate tbe 
Natioual Ddn in 8 Years, Wash Post (April 2, 201 6), ava ilable at https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/poli ti cs/in -tu nno i 1-o r- tri umph-dona ld-trump-stands-alon e/2 0 16/04/02/ 8c061 9b6 
-f8d6-ll e5-a3ce-ffi6b5ba21 f3 3_story.html (quoting Tnun p as saying "I'm getting names, The 
Federali st people. Some very good people."). 
'"' Richard \Volf, Supreme Court Winmnbes Auditiou, USA T oday (Nov 21, 2016), 5A. 
' '"' Q uoted in H ollis- Brusky, Ideas <Vitb Cousequenw at 152 (cited in note 13). It is for this 
ve ry reason tha t the Federali st Society can have a de facto monopoly on the credentialing of 
the right, whereas the American Constitution Society cannot occupy a similar role on d1e left . 
The liberal legal establishment is far too large for any one group to truly caprure Democratic 
judicial appointments. 
,., Bamn, .Judge.r and Tbeh· Audiences at 1-24 (cited in note 11); Frederick Schauer, ln-
m ltives, Replttation, and tbe h1glorious Determinant\' of}udicial Beb11vim·, 68 U Cin L Rev 615 , 
619- 21 (2000). For this reason, we take issue wid1 poli tical science models that assLmle d1at 
d1 e Justices are single minded in their pursuit of their preferred legal policy agenda. See 
Baum and Devins, 98 Georgetown LJ at 1529- 32 (cited in note 12) (discussing these political 
science models and our critique of them). 
''16 On social identities generally, see Henry T ajfel, Dijj'ermtiation Between Social Groups: 
Studies in rbe Social P.')'cbology of luwgroup Relrttiom (1978); Marilynn B. Brewer, Tbe iV!nny 
l'ace.r of Social Jdemity: lmpliratiom for Politiml PJycbology, 22 Pol Psycho I 115 (200 1). 
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they care about how they are regarded by people who are important 
to those identities. Family members, friendship networks, and other 
relationships that relate to Justices' social identities serve as reference 
groups. 197 
Indeed, people who are interested in becoming federal appellate 
judges are likely to be more interested in the esteem of others than 
are most other people. 198 Such individuals willingly accept reduced 
monetary compensation and constraints on their personal activities 
and behaviors in exchange for the power and esteem that attach to a 
position on the federal bench. 199 Moreover, the high level of public 
attention that Supreme Court Justices receive today heightens their 
incentive to attain positive reputations with those whose esteem they 
most care about. Certainly, today's Justices invest substantial energy 
in cultivating their image with outside audiences. In terms of the 
number of extrajudicial appearances and interviews Justices have per 
year, one study shows that, in the years since 1960, the nine current 
Justices are all in the top ten.200 It is therefore reasonable to posit that 
a desire for the esteem of others affects the Justices' behavior as de-
cision makers. 
As some scholars have posited, some Justices seem to care a good 
deal about how they are regarded by the American people as a 
whole.201 But Justices generally orient themselves more specifically 
toward the political, legal, and social elite groups to which they be-
long.202 No doubt, the elite audiences that are particularly in1portant 
to individual Justices differ, but the Justices' personal backgrow1ds 
197 Moreover, Supreme Court Justices are often associated with one or the other political 
party; many have worked for Democratic or Republican administrations and most have con-
tributed tO political parties. Correspondingly, recent social science evidence links partisanship to 
the composition of the federal bench, including the fact that most federa l court of appeals judges 
contributed to political campaigns before their appoinunem. See Adam 13onica and Maya Sen, 
The Politics ofSeleaiugtbe Bmcb jiwn tbe Bar: The Legal H·ofe.,:.·ion a11tl Pm·risanluwltives to Politicize 
rbe Jurlicimy (Harv Kennedy School, \Norking Paper No RWP 15-001 , 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/CS5V-2VCD. 
1
''" 13anm and Devins, 98 Georgetown L J at 1532 (cited in note 12). Judges' interest in rl1e 
esteem of other people is discussed in Thomas]. Miceli and Metin ?vi. Cosgel, Reputariou a111/ 
.Judicial Decision-71/tlkiug, 23 J Econ l3ehav & Org 31 (1994), and in Schauer, 68 U Cin L Rev 
at 625- 31 (cited in note 195). 
~'~'' See !hum and Devins, 98 Georgetown L J at 1532 (cited in note 12). 
' "" See Richard L. I-lasen, Celebrity ]1wice: Supre'!Jle Corm Edition 9 (U.C. Irvine School of 
Law, Research Paper No 20 15-61, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/3CZG-ZLS3. 
10 1 Friedman, Tbe Will of tbe People (cited in note 94); Jeffi·ey Rosen, Tbe iV!ost Democrat it: 
Bnmcb: Ho7V rbe Coun,. Serve Amerim (Oxford, 2006). 
'
0
' Ballin and Devins, 98 Georgetown L J (cited in note 12). 
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and positions make some audiences especially relevant. In particular, 
today's Justices are members of increasingly polarized elite social 
networks that help to create and reinforce their ideological commit-
ments.201 These competing networks have replaced the relatively 
consensual center-left social network that once helped shape the 
thinking of both Republican and Democratic appointees to the Court. 
In part because of this change, Justices appointed to the Court by 
Republican presidents since 1990 have been less likely to support 
liberal positions than pre- 1990 Republican appointees. The change 
has had less impact on the Democratic side, because Justices ap-
pointed by Democratic appointees were part of social networks that 
leaned to the left even before the era of strong polarization. 
B. REPUBLICAN Al'POINTEES TO THE COURT: FROM TI-IE 1950s 
TO TI-IE I 990S 
In their votes and opinions, several of the Republican appointees 
to the Supreme Court between 1950 and 1990 were more liberal than 
some Democratic appointees.20-l As noted in Part III, Republican 
presidents' appointment strategies help to explain this phenome-
non.205 But as early as the 1960s, when President Nixon complained 
about the liberalizing influence of the "Washington-Georgetown 
social set" on certain Justices/ 06 some observers maintained that a 
milieu of people and groups that shared liberal values, especially on 
civil liberties issues, influenced the behavior of the Justices. This 
milieu included the American Bar r'\ssociation, legal academics, Su-
preme Court reporters, and elite social circles in Washington, D.C.207 
According to this narrative, Justices who came to the Court as con-
101 Justice Sca lia described one resu lt: "It's a nasty time. When I was first in Washington, 
and even in my ear ly years on d1is Court, I used to go to a lot of dinner parties at which d1ere 
were people from bod1 sides. Democrats, Repnblicam. [ Wasbington Pore publ isherl Kad1arine 
Gra ham used to have dinner parties d1at rea ll y were qn.ite representative of Washington. It 
doesn't happen anymore." Jennifer Senior, lu Conve-rsmion: Antonin Scalia, 22, 27 NY Mag 
(Oct 14, 20 13). 
1114 See Section l.. B. For a discussion of conserva tive di sappoinunent in such appointmenrs, 
see Marc A. T hiessen, Wby A1·e Republimns So .rhvjiil at Picking Supnmte Court Justices?, Wash 
Post (July 2, 20 12), archived at hrtps://perma.cc/R52G-YHTM. 
1115 See Section I H. B. 
"~·Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in rbe Wbite llouse at 338 (Simon & Schuster, 
200 I); JoiUl W . D ean , Tbe Relmqui;-c Cboice at 171 (Free Press, 200 1). 
'
07 On the componellls of th is milien within d1e legal profession, see Teles, Cousen;ative 
/. ega/ Movemem at 22- 57 (cited in note 13). 
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servatives often moved to the left during their tenure on the Court 
in order to please this left-leaning audience. 20H Indeed, Justice An-
tonin Scalia adopted this narrative in his opinions, complaining of 
what he saw as his colleagues' undue responsiveness to the views of a 
liberal elite.209 
To determine whether some Republican appointees actually moved 
to the left during their tenure on the Court, we begin by comparing 
the Justices' voting records from early in their tenure with their re-
cords in later years. Such comparisons are very difficult, because shifts 
in the Court's agenda can create an impression of ideological change 
(or, for that matter, an impression of stability) that is illusory.210 But 
imperfect measures2 11 do support claims of leftward movement by 
"'"Economist and columnist T homas Sowell and two conse1vative federa l judges have 
posited that impact with pankular clarity. T homas Sowell , Justice Kwuedy Goes Soft on Crime, 
Columbus Dispatch All (Aug 13, 2003); Sowell , B!ackmun Plays to tbe C1·o·wd at 713 (cited in 
note 11 5); Attacking Activimt at 14 (cited in note 11 5); Robert H. Bork, Again, 11 Struggle fm · 
tbe Soul of tbe Coun, NY T imes A19 Only 8, 1992). 
""' Router v Evans, 517 US 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J , dissenting); United States v Virginia, 
518 US 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J, dissenting); Lmvreuce v Texas, 539 US 558, 602 (2003) 
(Scalia, J, dissenti ng); Obergefe/1 v /-lodges, 135 S Ct 2584, 2629 (2015) (Sca lia, J , dissenting). 
""See Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson, Tbe Least Dangerous Bmud; Revisited: Ne1v 
Evideuce on Supreme Court l?espomiveness to Pub/iL· Pt·eferences, 66 J Pol I 018, 102 3- 2 7 (2004). 
'
11 T he measures employed for this discussion i11clude the simple proportions of pro- civil 
liberties votes by Justices in tl1ei r fifth tluough tentl1 te rms, compared witl1 tl1eir fi rst and 
second terms, reported in !hum, .Judges and 7/;eh· Audieuces at 147 (cited in note 11); the same 
proportions, but witl1 an adjustJnent for change in the Court's agenda, reported in id at 148; 
and the simple proportions of pro- civil liberties votes in tl1e fifth through tentl1 te rms, 
compared witl1 the first and second terms, in cases covered on tl1e front page of the Ne7v York 
Ti11tes, reported in Baum and Devins, 98 Georgetown L J at 1577 (cited in note 12). The 
proportions of pro- civi l li berties votes were calculated with use of tl1e Supreme Court Da-
tabase, described in note 28. Cases were de lined as involving civil liberties if they fe ll wi tl1in 
issue areas I through 6 in tl1e Database, described at https:l/perma.cc/6FKS-BRPE. 
T he adjustJnent is described in Lawrence Baum, J\1easu1"iug Policy Cbange in tbe U.S. Supreme 
Court, 82 Am Pol Sci Rev 905 (1988). T hat adjustJnent is clearly imperfect, in tlu1t it rests on an 
assumption that tl1e average movement of the Justices between two terms is close to zero. 
However, it does provide a control for change in the composition of tl1e Court's agenda th;Jt 
c;mses Justices' voting records to become more liberal or more conservative even if those 
Justices' actual ideological posi tions have not changed. 
A second complication in tracking the .Justices' voting records is that tl1e definition of certa in 
issue positions as conse1vative or li beral has an element of arbitJ·ariness, because tl1e positions 
that are considered to be conservative or li beral do not simply follow deductively from broad 
va lues. O ne result is that perceptions of tl1e ideological sides on an issue (such as freedom of 
expression) sometimes change substantially over time. Lawrence Baum, Ideology in tbe Supreme 
Court (Princeton, 20 17). T he codu1g of Justices' votes in tl1e Supreme Court Database has been 
cri ticized on tl1e ground tl1a t it reflects coders' prior expectations about the Justices. Anna 
Harvey and Michael J \iVoodruff, Coufimwtiou Bias in tbe United States Supreme Court .Judicial 
Database, 29 J Law, Econ & Org414 (20 13). For tl1is reason, data on Justices' voting in table I 
and the ta bles that follow should be read witl1 caution. At the same time, there is considerable 
consensus on the ideo log·ica l direction of the competing positions on most issues, and in the 
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several Republican appointees with respect to civil liberties. Table 1 
shows those measures for several Republican appointees from Earl 
Warren through David Souter. 
This pattern of leftward movement might be idiosyncratic rather 
than a reflection of any systematic forces. 212 But it is a reasonable 
inference that these Justices, or at least some of them, were influenced 
by the elite groups with whom they interacted. As we saw in Sec-
tion II.B, Republican and Democratic elites often favored liberal 
outcomes on civi l liberties issues during this period.213 Moreover, 
legal academia and the most prestigious sector of the mass media 
leaned to the left in these years.214 
The impact of social environments seems most evident in the case 
of Justice Blackmun, whose substantial turn to the left was clearly 
reinforced by the approval ofliberal audiences in the elite news media 
and other sectors.215 Blackmun was unusually attentive to the mail he 
received relating to his work as aJustice/ 16 and he was close to some 
reporters.217 In public appearances before sympathetic audiences, he 
solicited and received positive responses to his decisions.218 
Justice Kennedy also seems particularly concerned with his public 
persona. According to one of his law clerks, Justice Kennedy "would 
constantly refer to how it's going to be perceived, how it's going to 
short term there is considerable stability in the tmderstanding of which positio ns ~re liberal and 
which positions are conservative. 
1
" On the role o f chance in crea ting what appear to be meaningful p~ tterns of behavior, see 
Carol M ock and .H erbert F . W eisberg, Political lmw111emcy: Encoumers witb Coiucidence, Im-
probability, and CIHmce, 36 Am J Pol Sci 1023 (1992). 
213 See no tes 97- LOO and accompanying· text. 
114 See notes 110 and ll5 and accompanying text; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, ResemdJ 
and Teru·bing on Lmv Fawlties: An Empiriwl Explomrion, 73 Chi Kent L Rev 765, 780 n 54 
( l 998) (discussing left-leaning tendencies of legal academies); Stanley Rothman and S. Robert 
Lichter, Pmwwlity, Ideololf)', and World Vie·w: A Comparison of Media 111111 Business Elites, 15 Bri t 
J Pol Sci 29 ( 1985) (di scussing libera l tendencies o f journalists before the Internet age); and 
David .H. \Veavcr and G . C leveland Wilhoit, Tbe lluN:rimn.Joumalist: A Ponmit of U.S. News 
People rmd Tbeir Work 25-32 (199 l) (discussing the same tendencies). 
115 13aum, .Judges rmd Tbeir Atulimccs at 153- 55 (cited in note ll ). 
"" Linda G reenhouse, Becoming .Justice Blackumn: Harry illflckuum 's Supreme Court .Joumey 
L34, 242 (T imes llooks, 2005); Harold Hongju Koh, A Tribute to Ju.~·tice 1-Jany A. Blackuum, 
LOS H ;lrv L Rev 20, 20 ( l 994). 
117 Richard Davis, Oe,·isiom and Images: ·rbe Supreme Court anti the Press L06 (1994). 
11
" Neil i\ . Lewis, B/mh nmt on Sean·b fm · tbe CenteT, NY T imes, A7 (Mar 8, l 986); Reynolds 
l lo lding, llltickunm Say.r Court Dhwtion Disappointing, SF Chron, A l 2 (June lO, l 992). 
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Table I 
Change in Percentages of Liberal Votes in Civil Liberties Cases, Selected 
Republica n Appointees, 1st-2nd Terms to 5th- 10th Terms (Part 1) ·' 
All Votes, Important 
Justice All Votes Adjusted~> Cases" 
Ea rl \tVa rren +34.8 +38 .9 + 16.6 
Potter Stewart +13 .0 + 12.5 + 6.6 
Harry J3lackmun + 6.9 +9.6 + 15.1 
Lewis Powell +2.2 + 7.9 + 12.0 
john Paul Stevens + 1.6 + 4.4 +6.7 
Sandra Day O'Connor + 1.4 - 3.0 + 14.3 
Anthony Kennedy + 13.9 + 1.6 + 33.7 
David Souter + 24.9 + 25 .7 + 20.4 
·• Scores on the first two measures are taken hom Banm, .Judges rmd Their Audimces at 
147- 48 (cited in note 11); scores on the third measure are taken from 13aum and Devins, 
98 Georgetown L J at 1577 (cited in note 12). 
h On this adjustment, see note 211. 
" Cases are defined as important if the Court's decisions were reported the fo llowing 
day on tl1e front page of the New York Times. This measure of case importance is described 
and examined in Epstein and Segal, 44 AmJ Pol Sci (cited in note 36). 
look."2 19 On the day the Court reaffirmed Roe in Planned Parenthood v 
Casey,220 he told a reporter that "[s]ometimes you don't know if you're 
Caesar about to cross the Rubicon or Captain Queeg cutting your 
own tow line."22 1 
By the time of Casey, however, the dominance of left-leaning media 
and academic elites had begun to wane. Conservative media outlets 
started to permeate the American mainstream,222 the conservative le-
gal network was on the rise, and the very incentives that had once 
pushed Republican nominees to the left now pushed a new breed of 
Republican nominees to the right. 
C. REPUBLICAN AP POINTEES: THE CURRENT COURT 
Aside from Justice Kennedy, the Republicans on the Roberts 
Court have remained steadfast in tl1eir conservatism: Justice Scalia 
119 Jeffrey Rosen, Th e Agoni.zer, New Yorker (Nov 11 , 1996), 82, 86 (quoting an unnamed 
Supreme Court clerk). 
120 Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833 (1992) . 
121 Terry Carter, O ·ossiug the Rubiwn, Cal Lawyer 39, 39- 40 (quoting Justice Kennedy). 
'" Grossman and Hopkins, A.rymmetric Politics at 150 (cited in note 77). 
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Table 2 
Change in Percent:1ges of Liberal Votes in C ivil Liberties Cases, Selected 
Republican Appointees, 1st- 2nd Terms to 5th- ! Oth T erms (Part 2)' 
All Votes, Important 
Justice All Votes Adjusted Cases 
Warren Burger - 4.4 - 9.7 - 10.0 
William Rehnquist - 4.6 + 2. 1 - 3.0 
Antonin Scalia - 3.3 - 16. 1 - 9.7 
C lnrence T"homas - 3.9 - 3.3 - 20.6 
John Roberb + 13 .2 +8.5 
Samuel Alita +5 .2 + 1.0 
·' See notes to table l. No resul ts are shown for important cases for Roberts and Alita 
because the list on which tha t analysis is based has not been updated since 2010. 
served for close to thirty years before his death, Justice Thomas has 
served for more than twenty-five years, and Justice Alito and Chief 
Justice Roberts have served for more than a decade.223 As table 2 
shows, only Roberts has moved in a liberal direction by the measures 
reflected in the table. Table 3 details the proportions of liberal and 
conservative votes by the conservative Justices-showing both fluc-
tuations over time and the substantial gap between all four of the 
strong conservatives and Justice Breyer, the most moderate of the 
Court's liberals.224 Because voting records are affected by changes in 
the Court's agenda from term to term, a Justice's record relative to 
the records of her colleagues in each pair of terms provides a better 
sense of her ideological positions than do changes in her proportions 
of liberal and conservative votes over time. 225 
The primary reason for the difference between the voting behavior 
of these Republican appointees and several of their predecessors is 
the evolution of appointment strategies discussed earlier. 226 In Sec-
w T his, of course, is not to suggest that conservative Justices vote as a bloc, consistently 
supporting conservaLive outcomes. There are important deviations, but these Justices gen-
erally back conservative outcomes. 
214 And while change in the Court's civil liberties agenda has resulted in some upward 
movement in tl1eir support for parties with civil liberties claims, tl1e Court's fo ur strong 
conservatives were relatively unfavorable to such claims- tl1ough with some important ex-
ceptions- tlHoughom the 2005- 15 T erms. 
"
5 See notes 21 0- 11 and accompanying text. 
"" See Section Lll .B. 
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Terms' 
2005- 06 
2007- 08 
2009- 10 
2011- 12 
2013- 15 
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Table 3 
Proportions of Liberal Votes in Civil Liberties Cases, 
Roberts Court, Selected Justices (Part 1) 
Justice 
Scalia Thomas Roberts Ali to 
23.9 19.7 23.5 19.6 
27 .9 18.6 31.4 26.7 
44.4 34.6 43.2 30.4 
32.9 25.0 32 .9 21.3 
37.0 32.7 48.5 34.7 
351 
Breyer 
63 .4 
61.2 
56.8 
53.9 
64.0 
" Each entry refers to a pair of terms or, for 2013-15, three terms. Thus, "2005- 06," 
for instance, includes the 2005 and 2006 Terms of d1e Court. 
tion III.B, we explored the role of ideology in these appointments227 
and explained that these four appointees have social identities that 
are deeply rooted in the conservative legal movement.228 
Once these Justices joined the Comt, the conservative movement 
continued to serve as an important reference group for them. Unlike 
earlier periods (when elite social networks were dominated by lib-
erals), conservative Justices on the Roberts Court had links with like-
minded groups and individuals who supported and reinforced their 
conservative positions. In particular, as noted in Section II.B, changes 
in the news media, academia, and the legal profession led to the es-
tablishment of conservative elite social networks.m 
In the case of Justice Thomas/30 for example, the elite conserva-
tive sector provided personal support during his early years on the 
Court, when he felt beleaguered by the criticism he had received 
during his highly contentious confirmation hearings. In response, in 
the words of one reporter, Thomas "constructed a world apart from 
his critics."23 1 He has appeared at law schools with relatively con-
"' See notes 160- 93 and accompanying text. 
" "See notes 170- 94 and accompanying text (noting ties of these nominees ro conservative 
movement); notes 185- 90 and accompanying text (discussing disavowal of Miers by con-
servative legal movement). 
""See notes I 11 - 21 and accompanying text. 
H n T his paragra ph draws from Baum,Judges rmd 1lJeh· Audieuces at 132- 35 (cited in note 1 I). 
m Marc Fisher, Tbe Private World of}ustice Tbomas, \Nash Post at B l (Sept I I, 1995). 
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servative orientations232 and focused his attention on news media 
with a sirnilar point of view.23 3 He has maintained ties with conser-
vative leaders and organizations like the Federalist Society,m and he 
has acknowledged that conservatives in the legal community serve as 
an important reference group for him.m It is noteworthy that 
when Thomas returned to Yale Law School in 2011, the two student 
groups with which he met were the Black Law Students Association 
and the law school's chapter of the Federalist Society.236 
As an original leader of the Federalist Society,237 Justice Scalia 
already had deep roots in the conservative segment of the legal elite 
by the time he became a Justice. Over the years, he made frequent 
appearances before groups with a conservative orientation. He was 
regularly honored by the Federalist Societym and participated fre-
quently in the organization's events. In 2012 alone Scalia participated 
in at least five Federa list Society events. 239 In 2013 he traveled to 
Montana to speak at a lunch aimed at building support for creation 
of a state chapter of the society/ '10 and in 2014 he journeyed to New 
York City to give a speech before a Federalist Society group.H' 
231 As a few examples, justice Thomas has recently appeared at Duke, see Duke Law 
School, .Justice C/annce Tboma.< Sbrms /-lis .Journey fi'om the South to the Supn:me Com1 (Oct 2 5, 
20 13), archived at https:l/perma.cc/EKY3-ETAA, and H arvard , see Harvard Law School, 
.Justice Thomas Speaks at l-larvard Lmo (v ideo) (Feb II , 20 13), arch ived at https://perma.cc 
/vVKV3 -LV47, and UVA, sec University of Virginia School of Law, U. S. Supreme Court 
.Justice Thomas Vi;irs UVA Lmv Sd;ool (Mar 13, 20 12), <lrchived at https://perma .cc/KB\iV9 
-X:X2N. 
m Lee Roderick, Leading tbe Cb111 ge: Orriu J-/mch and 20 Yean ofAmeriw 369- 70 (Gold 
Leaf, 1994). 
214 Baum, .Judges ami Theil · Audieuws at 13 3- 34 (cited in note II ). 
m Clarence T homas, Address Before rbe Fedemlist Society at the 1999 National Lmvyen 
Convemion (Nov 12, 1999), archi ved :lt https:!/perma.cc/9TWX-PU9D. 
"
6 Yale Law School, .Justice Clrll·ei!L'e Thoma.,· '7-1- Visits the Lmv School; iVleets 1vitb Swdem 
Groups, Teacbe.1· C!m'J (Dec 14, 2011), archived at https:l/perma .cc/QU7X-TYXP. 
m T eles, Con.rervativc Legal Moveme'llt at 1. 4 1-42 (cited in note 13);Joan Biskupic, Ameriam 
Original: 'n;e Life rmd Cou.rtitution of Supreme Court .Jusrice Antonin Swlia 5 (Farrar, Straus and 
Girom{, 2009). 
'
3
" Biskupic, /lum·imn Original at 7 (cited in note 237). 
ll'' Antonin Sc:1lia, Finrmciul Oi;dosu1·e Repo11 for Calendar Year 2012, 3 (May 15, 2013), 
:1rchived at lmps://penna.cc!PJ L6-E7R4. The fimmcial disclosure reports indicate reim-
bursed tr:wel, so they do not include appearances in vVashington, D.C. 
"" Laura Lu ndquist, Supreme Com1 .Justiu Is Drrnv for Conservative Lzmcbeon, Bozeman 
Chron (Aug 19, 20 13), archived at hnvs://perma .cc/VR5D-6M2R. 
' '" Antonin Scalia, Finrmcial Di;dO.IIt1'C Report f or Calendar Year 2014, 3 (May 15, 2015), 
archived at https://perma.cc/N79M-USF3. 
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Among his other appearances that year was a speech before a group 
of Hollywood conservatives called the "Friends of Abe. "242 In 2011, 
he spoke to members of Congress about constitutional interpretation 
at an event organized by the Tea Party Caucus.243 
As a judge on a federal court of appeals, Samuel Alito was "par-
ticularly active at Federalist Society national meetings."244 He was 
strongly backed by conservative groups at the time of his nomination 
to the Supreme Court245 and he has maintained his ties with con-
servative groups in the years since. Between 2010 and 2012, heap-
peared at three meetings of the Federalist Society outside Wash-
ington, D.C. and at the conservative Manhattan Instih1te.246 In 2008, 
Alito was the keynote speaker at the annual dinner for the conser-
vative magazine the Ame7'ican Spectat07··, and his remarks included 
distinctly partisan content. He also appeared at tl1e magazine's annual 
dinner in 2010.247 At a 2012 Federalist Society dinner, Alito took aim 
at botl1 tl1e Obama administration and critics of Citizens United, 
charging that critics of the decision were misleading the public and 
tl1at tl1e Obama Department of Justice was advancing a vision of 
society in which the "federal government towers over the people."24H 
In 2014, Alito was again the featured speaker at the Federalist So-
ciety's annual dinner.249 In 2016 Alito spoke at the society's annual 
meeting for lawyers, as did Justice Thomas. Alito described what 
"" ld . On the Friends of Abe, see Amy Fagan, Hollywood's Conservative Undergromlil, Wash 
Times AI (July 23, 2008). 
"'' Bill Mears, Justice Scalia Set to Adrh·ess Tea Party Caums on Capitol Hi!!, CNN.com 
(Jan 21, 20 11), archived at https://perma.cc/LK7W-ZQTA. 
244 T ush net, In tbe llalrmce at 49 (cited in note 21). 
245 See note (discussing Alito's support from conservative groups) . 
246 Samuel A. A lito, Finandal Disdom1·e Report f in· Calendm· Year 2010, 3 (May 12, 20 11), 
archived at htrps://perma.cc/UN8S-ERNC; Samuel A. AJito, Financial Disdo.mre Report for 
Caleudrn· Yem · 2011, 2-3 (Aug 13, 2012), archived at httvs://perma.cc/X932-ZALF. T he !Vlan-
hattan lnstitlJte {ur Public Policy describes its mission and activities at htrps://perma.cc/5R7M 
-KQ8R. 
147 Jeff Shesol, Sbould Justices Keep Tb eir Opinions to Tbemselvesr, NY Times A23 (June 29, 
20 11). The 2010 appearance feamred a confrontation with a liberal blogger who challenged 
Alita's involvement in a fimdraising dinner. Debra C 1ssens ' iVeiss, l1/ogge1· Loudly Questious 
A lito 's Diune1· Attendrmre, Tapes b-ate Semrit:y Gum·d, ABA J (Nov II , 2010), archived at 
htrps://perma.cc/MGQ3 -Z9PT. 
24
" See Mark Sherman, Samuel A/ito, Supreme Coun Justice, Takes 011 Citizens United O·itio·, 
Buffington Post (Nov 17, 2012), archived at https://perma .cc/9LNE-9R613. 
,.,, Shortly after tl1at Federalist Society appearance, Linda Greenhouse wrote tl1at Ali to has 
a "base" in the conservative movement. Linda G reenhouse, .It's All Rigbt 1vitb Sam, NY Times 
(Jan 7, 20 15), arch ived at https://perma .cc/f9TK-PBSK. 
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one publication called a "conservative agenda" for the Court.25° For 
his part, Thomas referred to his friendship with Justice Scalia as a 
"band of brothers," and he urged his audience "to join this band of 
brothers.m51 
Chief]ustice Roberts's record is more ambiguous than that of the 
Court's other conservatives.252 On the whole, however, Roberts is 
clearly a conservative.253 As table 3 shows, his record is much more 
conservative than that of Justice Breyer, the most moderate of the 
Court's libera!Justices.2H Roberts's voting record is best explained by 
a more moderate set of conservative policy preferences and his 
strategic considerations as Chief Justice. 255 Although his ties to the 
conservative movement since he joined the judiciary have not been 
as dramatic as those of Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, he participated in 
the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of the Federalist Society in 
" " Lawrence Hurley, A/ito Outlines Possible Comervative Agmda for U.S. I-ligb Court, Reuters 
(Nov 17, 20 16), http://www.remers.com/article/us-usa-court-al ito-idUSKBN13C2E7. 
15 1 Tony Mauro, Justice 1bomasto Fed Society: Sm/ia's 1-frm·k Is "Prologue," Nat'! L J (Nov 18, 
20 16), http:! /www .na tionallawjoumal.com/id = 1202772 781445/justice-T homas-to-Fed-So 
ciety-Scalias-Work-Is-Prologue?slret·urn = 20 1610251 23 108. 
"' In one of the debates among the candidates fo r the 20 16 HepubHcan nomination for 
presiuent, Ted Cruz referred to his support for Hoberts's confi rmation in 2005 as "a mis-
take," anti even J eb Bush hedged in his approval of his brother's nomination of Roberts. CNN 
Rwgrm Librm)' Debate: Later Debate Full 11Ymst1·ipt, CNN.com (Sept 16, 2015), arch ived at 
https:l/perma.cc/G78M-25UA. Donald Trump also attacked Roberts for writing an opinion 
ca tering to those inside the "beltway." See Egelko, 'b·u711p, Rubio Weigb in on Supreme Com't 
Aberul of Debate (cited in note 5). 
'H Adam Liptak, Cbief]uitice Amm·.,·es a Conservmive Record, and Wmtb from tbe Rigbt, NY 
Times A 16 (Sept 29, 20 15). 
H·l Roberts's Marti n-Quinn scores also hjghlight his relative conservativism, as does an 
ideological rankjng devised by Judge Richard Posner and Wi lliam Landes. See note 70 and 
accompanying text. Roberts's relatively hjgh proportions of li beral votes in the 2013 and 20 I 4 
Terms, like the Court's relatively high proportions of liberal decisions in those terms, 
probably re fl ect the kinds of cases that the Court heard in those terms. See Brendan Nyhan, 
Supreme Colln: Libeml Draft v. Conse-rvative Overreacb, NY Times (June 25, 2015), archived at 
https:l/pcnna.cc/E8G l{-CQCX. See also Ke1' in T. McGuire et al, Met~suring Policy Content on 
tbe U.S. Supreme Collrt, 7 I J Pol 1305 (2009) (explaining how case selection skews ideological 
nmking of Justices by making courts appear more liberal or conservative). 
155 See Dan Ba lz, Roberts Healrb Ctm l?uling Seuds a Message to Politidam, Wash Post 
(June 30, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/6AQT-8RCF (d iscussing instillJtional con-
cerns in Roberts ru ling); Adam L ip tak, Angering Conm-uatives ami Libemls, Cbief]ustice Rob-
errs Defends Steady Restmim, NY T imes (June 26, 20 15), archived at https://perma.cc/Z78C-
YGX2 (discuss ing ways Roberts trades off ideology for the pursuit of instimtional goals) . 
For a general treanncnt of how institutional concerns, including the power to assign deci-
sions, shape the decision making of C hief Justice Hoberts, sec Richard J. Lazarus, Back to 
/Jusine.n· at tbe Supreme Collrt: Tbe lld111inist-rative Side ofCbief Justice Roberts, 129 Harv L Rev 
F 33 (Nov 9, 20 15), archived at lmvs://perma.cc/7VL9-2 U6S. 
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2007 256 and, following Justice Scalia's lead, he presented a featured 
lecture at the society's annual meeting that same year. 257 
Another measure of the allegiance of today's Republican-appointed 
Justices to the conservative legal network is their tendency to hire 
law clerks who share their ideological views.25H Justices gave some 
weight to ideology in their selection of law clerks even before party 
polarization took hold, but that weight was limited. Reflecting the 
dominant ideology of the time, law clerks in that earlier era tended to 
be left-leaning, even if their Justice was not. 259 That is no longer true. 
Today, as measured by the lower-court judges from whom the Justices 
draw their clerks, the tendency of Justices to take ideology into ac-
count has become markedly stronger since the early 1990s, especially 
among conservative Justices .260 Table 4 shows the Justices' hiring 
practices for the 2005-16 Terms, the first twelve terms of the Roberts 
Court. The differences between conservative and liberal Justices 
shown in table 4 are far greater than those that existed in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.26 1 
156 Robert Barnes, Federalists Re/isb I'Ve/1-Piaced F?'ieuds: President, Several Justices J-ielp Cel-
ebrate Legal Sodety's 25 Yean· ofConservatimt, Wash Post A3 (Nov 16, 2007). Justice T homas 
participated prominently in the 2013 annual convention of the Federalist Society, and Justices 
Scalia and Ali to anended the convention. Ian Millhiser, I·l07v Conservmives Abandoned Judicial 
Restmi11t, Took Over tbe Comts and Radically Tmnsfomml America, T hinkProgress (Nov 19, 
2013), archived at https:l/perma.cdMP2Y-SJBD. 
157 7tb Annual Barbara K. Olson i\llemorial Lectlm, T he Federa list Society (Nov 16, 2007), 
archived at https://perma .cc/7P2P-I-'/NKH. 
'"Artemus Ward and Davis L. Wei den, Sorcerers' Apprentices: 100 Yetm ofLmv Clerks fiT tbc 
United States Supreme Coun (New York University, 2006). Since tlte 1970s, when it became 
standard practice for Justices to select clerks who had served in lower courts, there has been a 
similar tendency for Justices to take clerks from judges on the same side of the ideological 
specmun . See id at 83- 84. 
'
5
'' Todd C. Peppers, Courtiers of tbe MrnUe Palace: Tbe Rise am! lufiuence of tbe Supreme 
Comt Lrnv Clerk 34-37 (Stanford Law and Politics, 2006). 
"'° Corey Ditslear and Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and Polm·ization in tbe US. 
Supn:me Comt, 63 .J Pol 169 (2001); Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Com·t Law Clerks: 
Probing tbe .Ideological Linkage Between .Judges and Jwtiw , 98 Marq L Rev 333 (2014). See also 
Nelson et al, 62 Va ne! L Rev at 1775-80 (cited in note 121); Adam Liptak, A Sign ofCourr'.r 
Polarizmion: Cboh-e of Clerks, NY Times A1 (Sept 7, 2010); Geoffrey R. Stone, Tbe Dijfereuce 
Between Comervative and Liberal Justices, Buffington Post (Nov 2, 2013), archived at https:// 
perma.cdPTP5-RB39. As in the past, at least some Justices also take the ideological positions 
of prospective clerks tl1emselves into accOlmt. Amy Bach, 1Hovin' on Up witb tbe Fedemlist 
Soriery: J-lo1v tbe Rigbt Rerwr Its Young Lawyers, Nation 11 , 15 (Oct I , 2001). 
26 1 In the 197 5- 80 Terms, the highest percentage of clerks drawn from Democratic-
appointed judges was 68 .2 (for Justice Marshall); the lowest proportion was 37.5 (for Justice 
Relmquist) . In the 198 1- 85 Terms, the highest proportion was 73.7 (for Justice Brennan); dte 
lowest was 40.0 (for Rebnquist and Chief j ustice Burger). Ditslear and Baum, 63 J Pol at 880 
(cited in note 260). It is also noteworthy d1at clerks working for or slotted to work for Justice 
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Table 4 
Proportion of justices' Law Clerks \Vho Had 
Previously Served with a Republican-Appointed 
Lower-Court Judge, 2005-16 Terms" 
Justice Percentage 
T homas 97.9 
Sca lia 97.7 
AJi LO 94.4 
Roberts 80.9 
Kennedy 79.2 
Breyer 40.4 
Stevens 40.0 
Sow mayor 37.5 
Kagan 32. 1 
Souter 25.0 
G insburg 23.4 
·' T hese percentages were calculated from the information 
sheets compiled by the Court each term, Lrnv Clerks- October 
Tmn {various yean}: l.rnv Scbools and Prior Clcrksbips; for the 2016 
te rm, the information is from David La t, Supreme Coun Clerk 
Hiring W'atcb: Tbe Official List, Above tbe Lmv (July 22, 20 16), 
abovethelaw.com/20 16/07 /supreme-court-cl erk-hiring-watch 
-the-olficial-list- for-ot-20 16/. Clerks who served with state judges 
or with the fun1re Justice on a lower conn: and those who had no 
prior clerkships are not included. Where a clerk had multiple prior 
clerkships, the most recent clerkship was used; when the most 
recent clerkship could not be ascertained, a clerkship in a court of 
appea ls was counted ra ther than one in a clisu·ict court. 
[2016 
Unlike the 1950s through the 1990s, there is no longer a leftward 
pull on Republican appointees. Justices whose social identities were 
linked with conservatives and conservative groups prior to their 
appointments can now gain enthusiastic approval from conservative 
elites. Moreover, as demonstrated by their reactions to the 2012 and 
2015 health care decisions and the 2015 decision on same-sex mar-
Anton in Scalia found homes with Repub lican Justices after Scalia's death . Sca lia's 20 15 Term 
clerks completed their clerkships with Justi ces /\ li to and Thomas; clerks hired by Scalia for 
the 2016 Term found posiLions with Justices T homas, Ali to, and Kennedy. Tony Mauro, 
Fuwre Smlia Clerkr Find Ne-w l-fomes 1vitb Otber]ustices, Nat! LJ (May 13, 20 16), at http:// 
www. nati onall awjournal.com/id = 12027 57606269/Funlre-Scalia-Clerks-Find-New-Homes 
-Wit!l-Other-JusLices; D aviJ Lat, Supre-me Court I-I iring Wmcb, Above tbe Lrnv (July 28, 20 16), 
at h llp:/ /a bovethclaw.com/20 16/07 /su prcmc-cou rt-clerk- hi ri ng-watch-a-look-at-october-lerm 
-20 171. 
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riage, conservative elites will sharply condemn any deviations from 
their own positions.262 
D . DEMOCRATIC APPOINTEES 
The increasing ideological distance between Democratic- :md 
Republican-appointed Justices is largely a story of changes in the 
Republican Party. A<> a group, the Republican-appointedjustices have 
been appreciably more conservative than previous Republican nom-
inees.263 For their part, Democratic-appointed Justices are more ho-
mogeneous than before, but as a group they are not more liberal. 
Unlike previous Democratic appointees (some of whom were very 
liberal and others of whom were either moderate or conservative), 
all of today's Democratic-appointed Justices are moderate liberals. 2M 
As noted in Part III, the ideology of Supreme Court nominees has 
been more important to recent Republican presidents than to recent 
Democratic presidents. 
The changing profile of Democratic nominees is tied to broader 
changes in the Democratic Party. Before the mid-1960s, the Dem-
ocratic Party reflected an uneasy alliance between northern liberals 
and southern conservatives.265 The ideologically mixed character of 
the Democratic Party at that time was reflected in Supreme Court 
nominations. In a later era, nominees who held views like those of 
Stanley Reed, Fred Vinson, Sherman Minton, and Tom Clark would 
have been Republicans rather than Democrats; perhaps the same is 
101 The decisions were, respectively, National Federation of ludependellt /Ju.riu e.I'J" v Sebdi11s 
(note 22); King v Bunve/1 (note 22); and Obergefe/1 v Hodges (note 209). Examples of conser-
vatives' responses to Justice Kennedy's decis ive vote on Obe1gefell are Daniel Horowitz, ]11stice 
Kennedy's Nnked Politics nud tbe l-lypocri.r)' of tbe Court, Conservative Review, July 6, 20 15, at 
https:/ /www .conservativereview .com/ commentaty/2 015/07 IJ ustice-kennendys-naked-pol i tics 
-and-the-hypocrisy-of-the-court; and S. Ernie V\Talton, CousmJfltives Sbould Attark Obe1gejidl's 
Interpretive Metbod, Not Irs Hijacking oftbe Democmtic Proem·, September 26, 2015, at Imps:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?absn-act_id =2667223. For conservative elite reaction to Chief 
Justice Roberts's votes in the Affordable Care Act decisions, see Adam Lipmk, Cbief]w7h·e Jolm 
Robe11s A11lnsses a Couservmive Record, and vVmtb jirnn tbe Rigbt, NY Times (Sept 28, 20 15), at 
http://www .nyti1 nes .com/2 0 I 5/09/2 9 /us/politics/ chief-J ustice-j olm-roberts-amasses-conservative 
-record-and-dle-rights-ire.honl? _r=O; David G. Savage, Cbief]IIJtice Robms' Rew11llsn't Crm-
.rervmive Eno11gh jo1· Some Aaivi.1t>, LA Times (Sept 25, 2015), at lmp://www.latimes.com/nation 
/la-na-roberts-conservative-backlash-20150924-story.honl . 
w See notes 69-70. 
""' See figure I and accompanying text. See note 152 and accompanying text. 
'"' See Richard H. Pilcles, Wby tbe Cente1· Does Not Hold: Tb e Cnuses of Hype1polm·ized 
Democrmy in Amerim, 99 Ca l L Rev 273, 290 (2011). 
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true of Byron White.2M Nor was there anything like a liberal legal 
establishment in that era. The leaders of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, for instance, tended to be relatively conservative until the 
1960s.267 
Steven Teles has described how this changed with the develop-
ment of what he ca lls "the liberal legal network."268 Following the 
social changes of the 1960s, the American Civil Liberties Union and 
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund were joined by a 
set of new liberal public interest law firms . Legal academia took on 
a more liberal cast. El ite institutions, including the American Bar 
Association, also embraced more liberal positions. The civil liber-
tarianism of the late Warren Court both reflected and contributed 
to these changes. The result was the creation of a liberal network in 
the elite segment of the legal profession, although that network was 
looser and more diverse in its thinking than the conservative network 
that developed later.269 
The changes of the 1960s extended beyond the legal profession. 
The elite news media became more liberal, as did the "Washington-
Georgetown social set" to which President Nixon referredY 0 The 
leftward shift of the Democratic Party in the 1960s and 1970s helped 
ensure that when Democratic presidents once again gained an op-
portunity to appoint justices (beginning with Clinton in 1993), they 
would choose people who were at least moderately liberal. At the 
same time, the development of a liberal legal network created an elite 
audience for the Justices who supported liberal policy positions. Be-
cause there was no competing conservative legal network at that 
time, the growing liberalism of the elite world reinforced the liber-
alism of Democratic judicial appointees. 
Since rough ly 2000, the success of conservative legal organizations 
in shaping law and policy has made liberals more aware of the impact 
of elite networks. In particular, liberal lawyers and law professors 
perceived a need for an organization that would serve as a counter-
2
6(' See note 1 36 (discussing relative conservativism of the Truman nominees). 
" '
7 Teles, ConsmJfllive Legal Movement at 28- 29 (cited in note !3). 
"'" ld at 22- 57. 
2
"" David Fontana, 1-lo7V Size 1\llattcrs for Liberal and ConJerumive Constitutionalis71l (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on fil e with authors) . 
2711 See note 206. 
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weight to the Federalist Society.271 The American Constitution So-
ciety (ACS), founded in 2001, is largely parallel to the Federalist 
Society in its activities and goals.272 At the same time, though, no one 
group dominates the liberal legal network, and ideology plays a less 
overt role in Democratic appointments. 273 The lack of dominance for 
a single group reflects the multiplicity of organizations with a liberal 
orientation that have an interest in judicial appointments and poli-
cies _27·f 
N onetheless, Democratic-appointed justices w1doubtedly see them-
selves as members of a different team than their Republican cmm-
terparts.275 The ACS accentuates and facilitates this divide. Justices 
Breyer, Ginsbmg, and Sotomayor have all been keynote speakers at 
the ACS national convention.276 In greeting a national student con-
vention of the Federalist Society in 2005 when she was dean of the 
Harvard Law School, Elena Kagan declared that "I love the Federal-
ist Society," but "You are not my people."277 Moreover, all of the 
Democratic-appointed Justices in recent years have tended to appoint 
law clerks who have served with judges nominated by Democratic 
presidents, although the strength of that inclination varies consider-
ably and is dwarfed by the tendency of the Republican-appointed 
Justices to rely on Republican-appointed lower court judges.278 
271 Crystal N ix Hines, Young Liberal Lmv G1wtp Is Rtpanding, NY T imes A17 (June I, 
2001 ). 
"' Alexander Woh l, Libemlizing tbe Law, T he Nation 6 (June 16, 2003); Caro l D. Leonnig, 
Dancing!' It 's Good for tbe Comtitlllion: Janet Reno and hiendr 1i)' an UuconsenHnive Appl"OIIcb, 
Wash Post C 1 (Aug 4, 2003); Tresa Baldas, Law Scbool TmfWar Ignites, Nati LJ 1, 12 (Apr 26, 
2004). 
' " See notes 143-52 and accompanying text. 
m See Fontana, How Size Matters (cited in note 269). 
m See notes 101 - 09. 
no Most recently, Ginsburg was ti1e keynote speaker in 201 5 and Sotomayor in 2014. See 
Adam Liptak, Justices Get Out iWo1·e, but Calendan· An11't Open to Jw-r Anyone, NY Times 
(June 1, 20 15), archived at https:/ /perma.cc/M9JM-6NTA. Breyer was also keynote speaker 
at ti1e banquet of tl1e ACS national conference in 2004, see Justhe Stepbeu 1J1·eyer at tbe 200·1 
Ammal Couvemiou, America n Constitution Society (Ju ly 25, 2005), archived at https://perma 
.cc/WGD9-9RP4, and Ginsburg spoke at tl1e first na tional conference in 2003, "because the 
Society 's mission is important to d1e healti1 and welfare of our N ation," see Rutl1 Bader 
Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of tl1e United States, l?emrwks for tbe American 
Con.1"titution Society: Looking lleyo]/(1 Our Borden : Tbe Value of 11 Compmmive Pe1-spwive in 
Constitmiwal Arljudimtion l (Aug 2, 2003), archived at https://perma .cc/UA8P-UNUG. 
277 T ush net, A Conrt Divided: Tbe Rebnquist Couu and tbe Futm·e of Constitmional Lrnv <.10 
(Norton, 2005). 
"" See table 4. 
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T erms 
2005- 06 
2007- 08 
2009- 10 
2011 - 12 
2013- 15 
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Table 5 
Percentage of Liberal Votes in Civil Liberties Cases, 
Roberts Court, Selected JusLices (Part 2) 
justice 
Ginsburg Breyer Sotomayor Kagan" Kennedy 
66.2 63.4 35.2 
69.8 61.2 39.5 
60.5 56.8 63.8 64.3 46.9 
68.4 53.9 66.7 67.6 46.7 
63.4 64.0 71.0 62.6 50.5 
[2016 
Aliw 
19.6 
26.7 
30.4 
21.3 
34.7 
·' Kagan, whose tenure began with the 2010 T erm, participaLed in only Lwemy -eight 
civil liberties decisions in that te rm. 
Table 5 provides some perspective on the ideological positions of 
the current Court's Democratic appointees. All have been distinctly 
to the left of even the most liberal Republican-appointed Justice, 
Anthony Kennedy. The gap between them and the four more strongly 
conservative Republican-appointed Justices (represented in table 5 
by justice Alito) is even more substantial. 
The convictions of Democratic-appointed Justices are undoubt-
edly strengthened by liberal elite networks. These networks still 
dominate the academy, lawyer groups, and much of the media.m As 
tl1is part makes clear, the fact tl1at there are substantial audiences 
on both the liberal and conservative sides reduces the possibility that 
Republican or Democratic appointees will move away from their 
parties' predominant positions during their tenure on tl1e Court. 
V. CoNcLUSIONs 
In tl1e period that ended with Clarence Thomas's appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court in 1991, the role of tl1e president's party 
affiliation in shaping the Court's ideology was surprisingly small 
by current standards. Republicans often appointed moderates and 
liberals; Democrats often appointed moderates and conservatives. 
"
9 See .John 0. McGinnis et al, Tbe Prmems and lmplimrions of Political Contributions by Elire 
Law Famlty, 93 Georgetown L .J 1167 (2005) (noting d1 e propensiLy o f law professors to 
contribu te to Democrats) ; Adam Bonica, Adam S. C hilton, and Niaya Sen, 1'l1e Political 
Ideologies of' Ame1·icnn Lrnvyers, J Legal Analysis (ford1coming), archived at https:/ /perma .cc 
/URQB-QWWL (assert ing that law pro fessors are at leas t as liberal as any od1 er cohort o f 
lawyers, including public defenders) . 
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One vivid reflection of that pattern is evident in the frustration of 
conservatives with the failure of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to 
turn as far to the right as they had hoped for after a string of eight 
consecutive Republican appointments to the Court. 280 
Things have changed, though. Starting with the Reagan admin-
istration, presidents have increasingly paid attention to ideology in 
Supreme Court appointments. Republicans, in particular, helped es-
tablish a conservative legal network to vet and groom candidates for 
judicial appointment. And following the retirements of moderate 
Republican-appointed Justices David Souter in 2009 and John Paul 
Stevens in 2010, the lines of ideological division on the Court have, 
for the first time, coincided with partisan division. Today, every 
Justice appointed by a Democratic president stands to the left of every 
Justice appointed by a Republican president, and this is not likely 
to change any time soon. 
This development reflects fundamental changes in American pol-
itics. The growing ideological polarization of the parties at the elite 
level has given presidents stronger incentives to choose nominees 
whose ideological orientations match those of the president's own 
party. Elite polarization has also spurred the development of rival 
liberal and conservative social networks, and those networks have 
enhanced the president's ability to reliably identify predictably liberal 
or conservative nominees. Partisan polarization has affected the Jus-
tices as well, reducing the likelihood that they will stray from the 
ideological positions that brought d1em to the Court in d1e first place. 
The most direct consequence of d1is change is that presidential 
elections mean even more for the direction of d1e Supreme Court 
d1an they did in the past. The sudden dead1 of Antonin Scalia and d1e 
ensuing imbroglio over the nomination of Merrick Garland under-
score this realty. More generally, although the timing of vacancies 
on the Court is usually tmcertain, it has become more certain how 
presidents will fill them.2H1 Because Justices today typically serve for 
200 See Vincent Blasi, ed, Tbe Bmx er Com·t: Tbe Counter-Revolution Tbm Wasn't (1986); 
Craig Bradley, ed, Tbe Rdmquist Legaq (Oxford, 2006); Robert F, N agel, Bowiug to Precet!eut, 
\Veekly Standard (Apr 17, 2006), archived at lmps://perma .cc/MT Y7-AKNN (noting failure 
of Rehnquist Court to overrule precedents on school prayer, abortion, :mel other divisive 
issues). 
" ' ·w e do not mean to suggest that a Republican president will never again appoint a 
liberal Justice or that a Democrat will never appoint a moderate or conservative Justice. Our 
point is that parLy polarization makes such an appoinunent unlikely. 
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longer periods than the Justices of earlier eras/H2 the impact of 
presidential elections on the Court's membership comes more slowly 
than in the past. But that impact is now more long-lasting. 
Further, as the Court's Republican- and Democratic-appointed 
Justices become more distant from each other ideologically, the 
Court's policy direction wi ll become more volatile. In times when the 
number of Justices appointed by presidents of each party is close 
to equal, a single appointment can produce a substantial shift in the 
balance on the Court and, thus, in its decisions. By the same token, 
it will be less common for a single Justice to play the role of a mod-
erate who stands between the Court's conservative and liberal sides. 
Anthony Kennedy plays that role to some degree on today's Comt. 2H3 
No other Justice comes close to crossing party lines as frequently, and 
we doubt that future appointees will play such a role anytime soon. 
The Senate Republicans' refusal to confirm Merrick Garland, com-
bined with the election of Donald Trump in 2016, will have a pro-
found impact on the balance and direction of the Court. As a candi-
date, Trump made clear his goal of appointing Justices who would 
take conservative positions on specific issues,ZH4 and the candidates 
on his lists of potential nominees are all strong conservatives.2H5 Thus, 
if any of the three most senior Justices (Ginsburg, Kennedy, and 
Breyer) leaves the Court in the next four years, we can expect to see 
a sharp turn to the right, even relative to the Court before Justice 
Scalia's death. No longer will Anthony Kennedy be the "swing vote." 
Instead, it will likely be Chief Justice Roberts. 286 In that event, the 
Court will even more strongly reflect the partisan divide that is the 
central attribute of govenm1ent and politics today. And presidential 
elections will matter more to the Supreme Court's decision making 
going forward than they have ever mattered in om nation's history. 
On JanuaLy 31, 2016, President Donald Trump nominated Judge 
Neil Gorsuch to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court; on April 7, 
2017, the Senate confirmed the nomination. The choice of Gorsuch 
'"' .Justin Crowe and Christopher F. K1rpowitz, Wbere !-lave You Goue, Sbemum i\l[inton? 
'J/;e Decline of tbe Sbort-'T'e1m S1tpn:me Corwt .Justice, 5 Persp on Pol 42 5 (2007). 
' "
1 See ta ble 5; see also Epstein :md.Jacobi, 61 Stan L Rev (cited in note 27). 
" " Sec note 5. 
'"
5 See note 192 and accompanying text. 
'"
6 Sec W olf, Aging Sup1·en1e Court Ene1'briz es Republicans 1\lfo1·e Thau /Jemocmts (cited in note 3). 
Justice Stephen Breyer will be 78. Id. 
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and the process by which he won confirmation underline the changes 
in the selection of Justices that we have described. 
As we have discussed, the augmented list of twenty-one prospective 
nominees that Trump announced as a presidential candidate was 
created primarily by leaders of the Federalist Society. 287 Gorsuch had 
established strong conservative credentials through his clerkships for 
conservative judges, his service in the George W. Bush administra-
tion, his involvement in the Federalist Society, and his record as a 
court of appeals judge.288 He also had the advantages of strong edu-
cational credentials, a reputation as a very able judge, and a relatively 
young age. 
In the process that made Gorsuch a finalist for the nomination and 
ultimately the nominee, Leonard Leo of the Federalist Society played 
a central role.289 An experienced participant in the selection of federal 
judges, Leo took a leave from the society to assist in the selection of the 
nominee (and later in his confirmation). From the perspective of the 
Federalist Society and other people and organizations in the conser-
vative legal movement, all or nearly all the judges on the Trump list 
would have fit the desired mold rather well. But after a careful vetting 
process that included multiple interviews of leading candidates, Gor-
such's combination of strengths elevated him above all the other con-
tenders. 
In the polarized atmosphere of the confirmation process today, it 
was certain that nearly all Democratic senators would vote against 
confirming (yorsuch and equally certain that every Republican senator 
would vote for him. As we have discussed, judicial confirmation politics 
exemplify pervasive party polarization; today, the votes of Democratic 
and Republican Senators on Supreme Court nominees increasingly 
'"' See note I 92 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Federa list Society's role in 
vetting Trump nominees, see Lawrence Bawn and Neal Devins, Fedemlist Cumt, Slate Qan 3 I, 
20 17), available at lmp:l/www.slate.comhTticles/news_ancl_politics/jurisprudence/201 7/0llhow 
_ th e_feclera lis t_society _ beca 111e_ the_ de _fitcto _selector_ of_repu blican _supreme.h unl. 
'"" Dylan Matthews, Neil Gon'llch, Dounld Tnnnp 's Supre111e Com't Nominee, E.xplnined, Vox 
(March 20, 20 17), available at http://www.vox.com/policy-ancl-politics/2017/1131/14450024 
/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court. 
'""See j effrey Toobin, Tbe Conservrnive Pipeliue to the Supreme Conn, New Yorker (April 17, 
2017), avai lable at hnv:l/www.newyorker.com/magazinc/2017/04/ 17/the-conservative-pipe 
line-to-the-supreme-court; Eric L ip ton and J eremy vV. Peters, In Gorsurb, Couse7'Vmive Attivisr 
Sees Test Case for Reshnpiug tbe Judicimy, NY T imes (March 18, 20 17), available at https://www 
.nytimes.com/20 17/03/ 18/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-coun-conservatives.hunl. 
